American University in Cairo

AUC Knowledge Fountain
Theses and Dissertations

Student Research

1-1-2021

The Interpretation of International Investment Treaties: The
Application of MFN Clauses to Matters of Dispute Settlement in
BITs
Amr Mostafa Aabed Abdo
The American University in Cairo AUC, amraabed@aucegypt.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://fount.aucegypt.edu/etds
Part of the Dispute Resolution and Arbitration Commons, International Law Commons, and the
International Trade Law Commons

Recommended Citation

APA Citation
Aabed, A. M. (2021).The Interpretation of International Investment Treaties: The Application of MFN
Clauses to Matters of Dispute Settlement in BITs [Master's Thesis, the American University in Cairo]. AUC
Knowledge Fountain.
https://fount.aucegypt.edu/etds/1509

MLA Citation
Aabed, Amr Mostafa Abdo. The Interpretation of International Investment Treaties: The Application of
MFN Clauses to Matters of Dispute Settlement in BITs. 2021. American University in Cairo, Master's
Thesis. AUC Knowledge Fountain.
https://fount.aucegypt.edu/etds/1509

This Master's Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Research at AUC Knowledge
Fountain. It has been accepted for inclusion in Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of AUC
Knowledge Fountain. For more information, please contact thesisadmin@aucegypt.edu.

The American University in Cairo
School of Global Affairs and Public Policy

THE INTERPRETATION OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT
TREATIES:
THE APPLICATION OF MFN CLAUSES TO MATTERS OF
DISPUTE SETTLEMENT IN BITs

A Thesis Submitted to the
Department of Law

In partial fulfilment of the requirements for the
LL.M. Degree in International and Comparative Law

By

Amr Mostafa Aabed

September 2020

The American University in Cairo
School of Global Affairs and Public Policy
THE INTERPRETATION OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT TREATIES:
THE APPLICATION OF MFN CLAUSES TO MATTERS OF DISPUTE
SETTLEMENT IN BITs
A Thesis Submitted by
Amr Mostafa Aabed Abdo
to the Department of Law
September 2020
In partial fulfilment of the requirements for the
LL.M. Degree in International and Comparative Law
Has been approved by the committee composed of

Professor Thomas Skouteris
Thesis Supervisor_______________________________
American University in Cairo
Date ____________________
Professor Hani Sayed
Thesis First Reader______________________________
American University in Cairo
Date____________________
Professor Mai Taha
Thesis Second Reader____________________________
American University in Cairo
Date____________________
Professor Thomas Skouteris
Law Department Chair ___________________________
Date___________________
Ambassador Nabil Fahmy
Dean of GAPP__________________________________
Date___________________

ii

DEDICATION

To my brother Dr. Asem M.Aabed, who I will never forget
You are in my heart, thoughts and prayers

iii

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
I am sincerely indebted to my thesis supervisor, Dr. Thomas Skouteris, for his guidance
and support throughout the drafting process. His wide knowledge and patience made
this project possible to achieve. His thoughts gave me a fresh insight into the dynamics
of modern international law.
I am also thankful to Dr. Hani Sayed not only for taking the time to read and comment
on this thesis, but also for one the most interesting classes I had ever attend. I am also
thankful to Dr. Mai Taha for taking the time to read and comment on this thesis.
I would like to take this opportunity to thank Dr. Diana Van Bogaert for her persistent
help and academic support during my study in the LL.M program. I could not have
asked for a more active, welcoming and friendly professor.

iv

The American University in Cairo
School of Global Affairs and Public Policy
THE INTERPRETATION OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT TREATIES:
THE APPLICATION OF MFN CLAUSES TO MATTERS OF DISPUTE
SETTLEMENT IN BITs
A Thesis Submitted by
Amr Mostafa Aabed Abdo*
Supervised by Professor Thomas Skouteris
ABSTRACT
The decisions of the arbitral tribunals have been under heavy attack for the inconsistent
and unintended interpretations that went beyond the intent of the parties as it is
expressed in the treaty provisions. One of these misinterpreted provisions is the MFN
clause. Many tribunals have used this clause to allocate the adjudicatory authority
between international arbitration and domestic courts. The problem of this application
is a matter of treaty interpretation that is governed by the international rules of
interpretation in the VCLT. These rules provide a balance approach to treaty
interpretation and recognize equally the legitimate rights and interests of the host states
and foreign investors. The root cause of the interpretive problems in investor-state
arbitration is the neglect and misapplication of the international rules on treaty
interpretation. Although, interpretation is not an exact science, it is still a science
requiring the application of particular rules to produce correct results. These rules are
established to respect the states' intentions, not to deny any relevance of these intentions
to interpretation. A full compliance with these rules will lead to correct interpretations
and ensure that these interpretations are consistent with parties’ intentions as it is
expressed in the terms of the treaty. The duty of adjudicators is to discover the meaning
of the treaty provisions; examining evidence according to the logical sequence of the
rules of interpretation in the VCLT, and provide the parties with impartial
interpretations. It is not their duty to harmonize dispute settlement arrangements in
BITs or impose this harmonized system upon states against their intent. The actual
application of these rules of interpretation works as a roadmap to reach the consistent
meanings of the treaty provisions and will give us a negative answer to the question of
whether the MFN clause should be applied to dispute settlement provisions in BITs or
not.
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Introduction

Treaties are generally considered the most important source of international law
sources. It seems that the existence of a formal written binding agreement signed by its
parties is not a problematic issue within a consent- based theory of law. The provisions
of this agreement accord rights to its parties and establish obligations upon them.
However, the creative role of interpreters hampers this comforting picture of
international mutual obligations. This creative role raises two concerns. First, to what
extent do the texts of a treaty have determinate meaning? Second, do adjudicators have
the right to interpret the text in the way they choose or are they constrained by certain
rules that regulate the interpretation process?

The exponential proliferation of arbitral tribunals, ad hoc committees and international
investment treaties has led to unintended and inconsistent interpretations in respect of
the determination of treaty rights and obligations. Some adjudicators may adopt correct
interpretations and other reaches wrong interpretations to the same text. Consequently,
some interpretations deprived a party to a treaty from his rights and others may accord
rights beyond the clear meaning of the text. The problem is the neglect and
misapplication of the international rules on treaty interpretation.

The dilemma of interpretation has its overwhelming effects on international investment
law. The investment relations between states are govern by bilateral investment treaties
(BITs). The world has witnessed a great proliferation of BITs that contain many
provisions. These provisions determine the rights and obligations of foreign investors
and host states or define what might be called the standards of investment protection.
In this paper, I focus on the Most Favored Nation (MFN) clause that has become, in
one form or another, a usual provision in BITs. The interpretation of this clause affects
the scope of its application to the extent that it may be applied to dispute settlement
provisions in BITs regardless the wording of this clause. The application of this clause
to dispute settlement provisions - in BITs - has recently attracted significant attention
in international investment Law. The debate is about whether foreign investors should
rely on the MFN clause from in BIT – the basic treaty - to incorporate dispute settlement
provisions from a third-country BIT. Arbitral tribunals expand the scope of the
application of this clause based on the interpretation process. Moreover, they alleged
1

that MFN clause connects the BITs of the host states with the basic treaty through this
clause, which may resulted in the harmonization of dispute settlement arrangements in
various BITs

Dispute settlement provisions are the most important provisions in BITs. These
provisions address foreign investors, host states and arbitral tribunals. These clauses
determine how any dispute may arise out of BIT between states and foreign investors
shall be resolved. Nowadays, international arbitration is generally accepted as an
effective avenue for resolving international investment disputes. From the perspective
of the foreign investors, recourse to international arbitration guarantees the
international protection for his rights and interests. They think that domestic courts lack
to the sufficient impartial and independence to judge against their governments and
cannot grant sufficient protection to the foreign investors. From the perspective of the
host states, allowing foreign investors to access international arbitration is ample
evidence that these states will met their treaty obligations. This may increase the
foreign direct investments on their territories. However, states try to narrow the scope
of access to international arbitration by limiting the jurisdiction of the international
arbitral tribunals.

These limitations may prevent the foreign investors from access to international
arbitration or impose procedural requirements before initiating international
arbitration. The question here is should investors circumvent these obstacles, the
binding dispute settlement provisions, to access international arbitration by the
incorporation of most favorable procedural treatment from a third-country treaty,
despite the clear host state's consent to a certain type of dispute settlement
arrangements. Can we face a different answer in case that this consent is not clear and
the text is ambiguous?

The scope of the application of any treaty provision, the MFN clause for instance,
depends on the interpretation of this provision. The application of the MFN clause to
dispute settlement provisions has proved to be one of the most controversial issues.
Arbitral tribunals have given contradicting meanings to the same MFN clause. Some
tribunals do not apply this clause to dispute settlement provisions in BITs and other do.
The application of the MFN clause to dispute settlement arrangements covers many
2

situations. For instance, when the basic treaty does not contain dispute settlement
arrangements, should an investor rely on the MFN clause to invoke dispute settlement
arrangements contained in a third-party treaty to access international arbitration? When
the basic treaty allow an investor to access international arbitration without no choice
in respect of the type of arbitration, such as ad hoc arbitration, should investors rely on
MFN clause to benefit form a certain type of international arbitration contained in
dispute settlement arrangements in a third-party treaty? When the basic treaty allows
access to international arbitration only for a specific type of disputes, such as the
amount of compensation for expropriation, should the beneficiary of MFN clause
benefit from the dispute settlement arrangements contained in a third-party treaty that
allow access to international arbitration for any type of disputes? When the basic treaty
requires the fulfillment of certain procedures before initiating international arbitration,
such as the exhaustion of domestic remedies, should the investor rely on the MFN
clause to benefit from dispute settlement provisions in a third-party treaty that do not
required these procedures.

In this thesis, I argue that the broad wording of the MFN clause does not allow
adjudicators to expand the scope of its application to dispute settlement provisions in
BITs. In other words, the MFN clause should not serve as a title of jurisdiction, to
allocate the adjudicatory authority between international arbitral tribunals and domestic
courts. Moreover, the interpretation of this clause came one-side oriented - investor
oriented - and gave the ultimate effect to facilitate access to international arbitration to
guarantee excessive protection to investors' rights and interests. They simply adopt a
broad interpretation to investors' treaty rights provisions. The treaty parties did not
intend to expand the scope of the MFN clause, as a treaty provision, under the will of
the investors.

The answer of this research question may guide the decision-making of arbitral
tribunals, investment treaty makers and legal scholars to the real role of the MFN clause
and the proper way of interpreting and applying this clause to matters of dispute
settlement in a way that respect the mutual treaty obligations and rights.

It is a necessity to differentiate between two kinds of provisions that are contained in
BITs and both of them can be subject to the application of the MFN clause. The first
3

kind is the substantive provisions that determine the substantive treaty obligations of
the host states and the treaty rights of the investors. For instance, BITs provisions that
deal with denial of justice; fair and equitable treatment standard; full protection and
security; international minimum standard; legitimate expectations and national
treatment. The second kind is the procedural provisions or dispute settlement
provisions that determine how a host state and an investor will resolve any investment
dispute arises out of BIT. This paper focuses on the second kind; the application of the
MFN clause to dispute settlement provisions in BITs and whether foreign investors
should rely on this clause to expand or establish the jurisdiction of international
investment tribunals or not.

The main obstacle that may limit this paper is that the jurisdictional decisions of the
international arbitral tribunals are confidential, especially the new decisions, and they
are not published until the arbitral parties allow so. However, I use all publicly available
arbitral awards and decisions that are relevant to the purpose of this thesis.

In this paper, I attempt to shed the light on the answer of the question of whether the
MFN clause should be applied to dispute settlement provisions in BITs or not? In clear
words, should MFN clauses serve as a title of jurisdiction, should these clauses allocate
the adjudicatory authority between international arbitral tribunals and domestic courts?
Therefore, it would be substantial to examine many MFN calluses that are contained in
various BITs and the arbitral decisions that dealt with the interpretation and the
application of these clauses to dispute settlement provisions. I analyses the legal
reasoning of these tribunals to figure out their ways of thinking in interpreting these
provisions.

In chapter I of this thesis, I explore generally the MFN clause in BITs. I discuss the
origins of investment protection to prove that interpretation of MFN clause is not the
first or the latest "episode" in a long history of a constant demand of foreigners to
prevent domestic courts to hear their cases. Then I discuss the historical background of
a MFN clause, its definition and the scope of its application. Then I explore the
distinction between substantive and procedural provisions in BITs. In addition, the
contemporary practice regarding MFN clauses in GATT and the WTO. Then I briefly
discuss the arguments of proponents and dissenters to the application of the MFN
4

clause to dispute settlement provisions in BITs. In chapter II, I discuss the nature of
treaty interpretation. This includes the answer to the question of whether treaty
interpretation is an exact science or an art. Then I scrutinize the arbitral use of the
international rules on treaty interpretation in the VCLT and the correct way of their
application. In chapter III, I discuss the contemporary case law on the application of
the MFN clause to dispute settlement provisions in BITs. I indicate the problems with
the decisions that have applied this clause to dispute settlement provisions and the
solutions of these problems by discussing decisions that have rejected this application.
In chapter IV, I point out the two visions on the application of the MFN clause to
matters of dispute settlements. I assess the vision that calls for the application of the
MFN clause to dispute settlement provisions in BITs and suggestions to resolve the
interpretive problem of this clause.

5

I.

Most Favored Nation clauses in BITs

The awards of arbitral tribunals have been under heavy attack for the inconsistent and
unintended interpretations of some provisions in BITs. Tribunals have criticized each
other for interpretations that went beyond the intent of the parties as it is expressed in
the treaty provisions. Some of these tribunals interpreted a treaty provision to increase
states' treaty obligations in a way that incompatible with the actual meaning of the texts.
One of these misinterpreted provisions is the MFN clause.

It is impossible to analyze the debate about the interpretation of the investment treaties
without going into the characteristics of the MFN clause as a practical example of this
thesis. The first section of this chapter explores the origins of investment protection. It
proves that the interpretation of the MFN clause is not the first or the latest "episode"
in a long history of a constant demand of foreigners to prevent domestic courts to hear
their cases and instead seek the assurance of an international or internationalized forum.
The second section provides the historical background of the MFN clause. The third
section provides the definition of the MFN clause. The fourth section provides the
scope of the application of the MFN clause. The fifth section discusses the distinction
between substantive and procedural provisions in BITs. The sixth section discusses the
contemporary practice regarding the MFN clause in GATT and the WTO. The seventh
section explores briefly the arguments of proponents and dissenters to the application
of the MFN clause to dispute settlement provisions in BITs.

A.

The Origins of Investment Protection:

Interpretation of the MFN clause in relation to its application to dispute settlement
arrangements in BITs is not a today issue. In fact, it is not the first nor will be the latest
"episode" in a long history of a constant demand of foreigners to prevent domestic
courts to hear their cases and instead seek the assurance of an international or
internationalized forum. Indeed, investors, foreigners and colonial powers always
wanted "exceptionality" in the forum that deals with legal disputes. By keeping the
dispute outside the jurisdiction of the domestic courts, they will not be treated as
"equals", but as "superior". Therefore, foreign investors do not accept the local
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jurisdiction and demand special treatment in in a manner where they can control better
the outcome of the adjudicative process. The development of foreign investors'
treatment started from the complete outlawry in the early political communities to what
is reflected in the current network of international investment agreements.

There is no a comprehensive history of the treatment of foreigners and their property
under international law.1 However, historical records tell us that the early political
communities denied any legal capacity and rights to foreigners.2 Those "outsider" or
"aliens" were treated as enemies or outcasts.3 The legal status and treatment of the
aliens have been improved through history. Edwin Borchard in his book, The
Diplomatic Protection of Citizens Abroad, wrote that the" legal position of the aliens
has in the progress of time advanced from the complete outlawry, in the days of the
early Rome and the German tribes, to that of the practical assimilation with nationals,
at the present time".4
International law protected the right of aliens to travel, live and trade in foreign lands.5
A host state's mistreatment of foreigners or his property was considered as an injury to
foreigners' home state and gave the later state the right to claim reparation.6 This
underlying the exercise of the diplomatic protection that can be traced back to the
Middle Ages.7 According to the principle of diplomatic protection, "an injury to a
state's national is an injury to state itself, for which it may claim reparation from any
responsible state"8. The examination of the rules of the diplomatic protection is beyond
the scope of this thesis, but it is important highlight that foreigner investors, in that
time, have no control over the international claim-making process. A state has
1

See ANDREW NEWCOMBE & LLUÍS PARADELL, LAW AND PRACTICE OF INVESTMENT
TREATIES: STANDARDS OF TREATMENT, 3 (1st edition, Kluwer Law International Publisher,
2009).
2
See id.
3
See id.
4
EDWIN BORCHARD, THE DIPLOMATIC PROTECTION OF CITIZENS ABROAD: OR THE
LAW OF INTERNATIONAL CLAIMS. 33 (New York Banks Law Publishing Co. 1915).
5
See Newcombe & Paradell, supra note 1, at 4.
6
See id.
7
See id. at 5.
8
Id. See also Art .1 of the ILC's Draft articles on Diplomatic Protection provides that "diplomatic
protection consists of the invocation by a State, through diplomatic action or other means of peaceful
settlement, of the responsibility of another State for an injury caused by an internationally wrongful act
of that State to a natural or legal person that is a national of the former State with a view to the
implementation of such responsibility. Rep. of the Int'l Law Comm'n, 58th Sess., May 4 -June 5, July 6Aug 7, 2006, U.N. Doc. A/61/10; GAOR, 61st Sess., Supp. No. 10 (2006).
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discretion power to decide whether to exercise the diplomatic protection or not.9 The
exercise of diplomatic protection depended on many things like the merits of the claim
or geopolitical interests that might be affected by the making of a claim.10

If we see the evolution of the diplomatic protection in its historical context, we will
recognize the abuse of diplomatic protection. In the era of colonialism and imperialism,
"states exercised all possible means – political, economic and military – to protect their
nationals' interests abroad"11. During the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the
exercise of this protection by powerful states was accompanied by "gun-boat
diplomacy", since "the use of force to exercise the diplomatic protection was not
inconsistence with international law"12.

International trade and investment expanded within the colonial political and legal
regimes.13 With the existence of the colonial territories and extraterritorial jurisdiction,
there was no need to powerful countries to recourse to international law process to
protect their nationals.14 Colonial political and military power protected their nationals
- colonists - and their property from any domestic control in the colonies.15
Extraterritorial jurisdiction allowed powerful states to apply their laws to their nationals
in foreign states.16 The extraterritorial jurisdiction was imposed by force through the
treaties of capitulation.17 This extraterritorial jurisdiction, in one form or another, was
existed in Egypt, Morocco, china, japan, Thailand, Iran, Turkey and other parts of
Ottoman Empire.18

I will speak about Egypt as a concrete example. On the nineteenth century, foreigners
were immune from the jurisdiction of domestic courts and were exempt from the
ordinary legislations. Before the Conference of Montreux in 1937, when the
Convention of 8 May 1937 regarding the abolition of the Capitulations in Egypt was

9

See Newcombe & Paradell, supra note 1, at 6.
See id.
11
Id. at 8.
12
See id. at 9.
13
See id. at 10.
14
See id. at 11.
15
See id.
16
See id.
17
See id.
18
See id.
10
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concluded, foreigners "were immune from the criminal jurisdiction of the Egyptian
Courts and could be tried only by their own Consular Courts"19 which were competent
to decide anything that affect their legal status. Foreigners also were exempt from
ordinary Egyptian legislations unless Assembly of the Mixed Court of Appeal accepted
the application of these legislations upon them.20 Moreover, the application of Egyptian
financial legislations to foreigners required the formal consent of their governments.21
These large exceptions from the Egyptian jurisdiction allowed foreigners to move
freely and pursue their interests in Egypt without any restrictions by the Egyptian
authorities. Foreigners subjected only to the domestic legislations of their own
countries and the laws that their own Consular Courts chose to impose.22

Not everyone has agreed that achieving justice to foreigners was the aim of the
establishment of the Consular Courts and Mixed Courts.23 These courts were about a
set of privileges granted to the nationals of certain countries who were exempted from
the application of domestic laws and the jurisdiction of domestic courts. These
privileges had been established by an agreement between the Egyptian government and
the capitulatory powers.24 These exceptions were closely associated with the
capitulations of the Egyptian government. The consular courts and mixed courts might
appear to some as tools of achieving stability in the judicial system to foreigners.25
However, for others these courts were a product of the foreign influence on Egypt and
a limitation on its sovereignty.26 Even when a foreigner was found guilty by these
courts, the Egyptian government could not expel him without the consent of his
Consul.27 Indeed, these privileges were misused and great abuses were existed,28 to the
extent that in 1936 the weekly al Musawwar described these courts as a "crime against
humanity".29

19

A. McDougall, The Position of Foreigners in Egypt on the Termination of the Mixed Courts,
26 Brit. Y.B. Int'l L.358, 359 (1949).
20
See id.
21
See id.
22
Id. at 360.
23
See Nathan J. Brown, The Precarious Life and Slow Death of the Mixed Courts of Egypt, 25
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF MIDDLE EAST STUDIES. 33, 33 (1993).
24
See id.
25
See id.
26
See id.
27
See McDougall, supra note 19, at 360.
28
See id.
29
See Al-Musawwar, 29 June 1936, included in Fish to secretary of state, 29 June 1936, State General
Records, Record Group 59, 783.003/116 National Archives, Washington, D.C.
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After the Conference of Montreux in 1937, the legal position for the foreigners was
modified.30 Their subjection to the domestic legislation would no longer required the
consent of their governments.31 Moreover, they subjected to the jurisdiction of the
mixed-courts.32 Although, Britain had recognized the independence of Egypt in 1922,
she had reserved responsibility of the protection of minorities and foreign interests in
Egypt. This reservation had been withdrawn by Article 12 of the 1936 Treaty that
expressed "that the responsibility for the lives and property of foreigners in Egypt
devolves exclusively upon the Egyptian Government, who will ensure the fulfilment
of their obligations in this respect".33 The Egyptian obligation of protecting the lives
and property of the foreigners was imposed on Egypt by international law.34 This was
the usual situation with the third world states, the obligations towards foreigners and
their interests were and still imposed by international norms after the termination of the
Mixed Courts.

It seems that the history repeats itself and the old ideas have a capacity for a revival in
new forms. Most international lawyers in Africa and Asia think that the international
order "was formed by the statesmen and thinkers of the past, in order to facilitate the
suppression of the people of the non-European world"35. M. Sornarajah, for instance,
argues that the use of the standard of civilization in international law is a clear example
for doctrines of exclusion in respect of the non -European world.36 Sornarajah sees that
the " in many other areas of international life, the instrumental use of international law
in order to fashion rules that will ensure respect for the will of the powerful will be
attempted and may succeed"37.

The end of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s can be described as milestone in
the development of the investment protection.38 In many cases, Investors could
30

See McDougall, supra note 19, at 360.
See id.
32
See id.
33
Id.
34
See id.
35
M. Sornarajah, Power and Justice: Third World Resistance in International Law, 10 SINGAPORE YEAR
BOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW.19, 26 (2006).
36
See id.
37
Id. at 29.
38
See Jean d'Aspremont, International Customary Investment Law: Story of a Paradox, 8 Amsterdam
Center for International Law.1, 13(2012).
31

10

recourse to international adjudication based on clauses that allow investor-state
arbitration with unqualified state consent.39 Foreign investment protection played a
significant role in the formulation of international norms.40 With the massive
proliferation of arbitral tribunals and international courts, it has become easy to
formulate binding and enforceable norms upon states. Sornarajah rejects that a series
of arbitral awards followed by confirmatory writing of the so-called "highly qualified
publicities" result in the creation of international law.41 He said that "members of the
so-called "arbitration fraternity" elevate each other in status, cite each other’s views
and create law on the basis that they are highly qualified publicists"42. This way of
lawmaking found a resistance by the Third World states.

However, this resistance to the preferred norms of private power crumbled because of
the dissolution of the unity of the Third World, theories of free market-led
development, and the strategies of the International Monetary Fund and the World
Bank.43 Developing states have become parties to many BITs to protect reciprocal
flows of foreign investment. In reality, this protection is for one-way flows of foreign
investment that happened from developed and powerful countries to developing
countries.44 These BITs include many clauses that ensure the protection of foreign
investors - special treatment - from the domestic courts and domestic legislations of the
host states.45 Moreover, the scope of this protection is enhanced by the expansive and
wrong interpretations that produced by arbitral tribunals.46Arbitration clauses are the
most important provisions of these BITs, since this kind of clauses gives foreign
investors the right to invoke arbitration unilaterally.47 This resulted in a profusion of
the awards and decisions of arbitral tribunals that give affirm and articulate the
principles of investment protection that work as an immunity against the jurisdiction
of the domestic courts in the host states.48

39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48

See id.
See Sornarajah, supra note 35, at 30.
See id. at 31.
Id.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 32.
See id. at 33.
See id.
See id.
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The previous practices constitute the history of a constant demand of foreigners to
prevent domestic courts from hearing their cases and instead seek the assurance of an
international or internationalized forum. Because of the diverse and the constantly
changing of the international environment, no one can predict the future of dispute
settlement mechanisms in respect of international investment disputes. In this thesis, I
focus on the problem of the application of the MFN clauses to dispute settlement
arrangements as one of the recent practices of arbitral tribunals and foreign investors.
This clause has been used to serve as a title of jurisdiction to allocate the adjudicatory
authority between international arbitral tribunals and domestic courts. Moreover, this
clause has been used as a multilateralization tool that works on the harmonization of
dispute settlement arrangements and as a procedural protection for foreign investors,
regardless the wording of the MFN clause.

B.

The Historical Background of the Most Favored Nation clause:

The MFN clause is a treaty provision under which a state accords to other contracting
state's investors "treatment that is no less favorable than that which it accords to other
or third States"49. This clause was contained in the bilateral Treaties of Friendship,
Commerce and Navigation (FCN treaties), which were concluded to facilitate and
regulate a variety of matters, of commercial nature, between states parties and
reciprocally protect investors and investments. For instance, a 1654 treaty between
Great Britain and Sweden provided "the People, Subjects and Inhabitants of both
Confederates, shall have and enjoy in each other’s Kingdoms, Countries, Lands, and
Dominions, as large and ample privileges, relaxations, liberties, and immunities, as any
other Foreigner at present doth, or hereafter shall enjoy there"50.

Such a clause was a form of non-discrimination clause that guaranteed that host state
would provide foreign investor with treatment as good as, what other foreign investors
were received. The MFN provisions aimed to facilitate economic activities and to
guarantee that the subjects of a state will not be discriminated against with comparison

49

See Andreas R. Ziegler, STANDARDS OF INVESTMENT PROTECTION, 60 (A. REINISCH. eds.,
1st ed. Oxford University Press, 2009).
50
Treaty of Peace and Commerce, Great Britain. Sweden., art. IV, Apr. 17, 1654, British and State
Foreign Papers 1812–1814, vol. I, Part I.
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to a third state. It was not a guarantee of national treatment that was received by citizens
who may receive a better or worse treatment than foreign investors. Thus, we cannot
consider that the MFN clause was a comprehensive non-discrimination clause.51

In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Most Favorable Treatment was not
granted automatically, it was granted conditionally. A country would grant this
treatment in exchange for any benefit provided by other third country. Therefore, to
benefit from Most Favorable Treatment a state had to pay for. This is known as
"conditional most favored nation". With the greater realization of the great benefits
that a state can achieve from granting "unconditional most favored treatment" to other
state rather than "conditional most favored nation", the granting of "conditional most
favored nation" lost its significance and the scope of its implementation has been
decreased today.52

With the overwhelming proliferation of BITs that govern, facilitate and protect
international investments, The MFN clause has been given a new lease on life. There
has been a vast increase in the negotiation of BITs that usually include, in one form or
another, most favored nation clause. Resorting to dispute settlement mechanisms such
as the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) and the
United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) Arbitration
Rules has resulted in contradictory interpretations of the MFN clause. These
contradictory interpretations have brought this clause to the front of the debate.

C.

The Definition of the MFN Clause:

In 1978, The International Law Commission's draft article (ILC) defined the MFN
clause as follows, "a most-favored-nation clause is a treaty provision whereby a state
undertakes an obligation towards another state to accord most-favored-nation treatment
in an agreed sphere of relations".53 Due to the ambiguity of the previous definition, the
working group of the ILC redefines the MFN clause as follows; "a most-favored-nation
51

See Rep. of the Int'l Law Comm'n, 67th Sess., May 4 -June 5, July 6-Aug 7, 2015, U.N. Doc. A/70/10;
GAOR, 7th Sess., Supp. No. 10 part II, para 7 (2015).
52
See id.
53
See Rep. of the Int'l Law Comm'n, 33rd Sess., May 8 – July 28, 1978, U.N. Doc. A/33/10; GAOR,
30th Sess., Supp. No. 10 Vol II, 18 (1978).
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clause is a provision in a treaty under which a State agrees to grant to the other
contracting partner treatment that is no less favorable than that which it accords to other
or third States."54

The previous ILC's definitions determine three important elements of the MFN clause.
First, this clause prohibits host states from discriminating against persons "investors"
or things "investments" of a state and a third state. Second, the MFN clause is applied
where the "investors or investments" of the beneficiary state is in the same relationship
of the third state with the host state. Third, the investor receives less favorable treatment
than the host state provides to, the comparators, the third state.55

Two main MFN clause's characteristics should be paid our attention. First, states'
obligations under the MFN clause are strictly treaty obligation; this obligation does not
based on customary international rules, but on the basic treaty. Therefore, the scope of
the MFN clause as a treaty provision should be determined according to the wording
of this clause.56 Second, the MFN clause imposes relative obligations upon the states
parties. Unlike other treaty provisions, it is impossible to determine an absolute content
of the favorable treatment that is granted by the host state to various investors.
Therefore, the treaty parties can restrict the scope of the application of the MFN clause
to certain kinds of treatment.

D.

The Scope of the Application of MFN Clauses:

The traditional view is that the MFN clause is applied only to the substantive treatment.
To prohibit discrimination that may occurs by the host states against foreign investors
or foreign investment of different nationalities. The decision of the arbitral tribunal in
Maffezini was the point of change that gave the MFN clause unpredicted dynamic role
as a title of jurisdiction.57 Under an extensive interpretation, this clause can allocate the
adjudicatory authority between international arbitral tribunals and domestic courts
regardless the intentions of the treaty parties. In contrast, under a narrow interpretation,
54
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many arbitral tribunals have refused the application of the MFN clause to dispute
settlement provisions in BITs. These visions of arbitral tribunals have resulted in
contradictory interpretations based on different interpretations to the MFN clauses that
have the same wording.

The application of the MFN clause to dispute settlement provisions has become a
significant interpretive problem in investor-state arbitration. Practitioners, civil
societies and states have criticized the arbitral tribunals for their expansive, narrow or
inconsistent interpretation to these clauses. Moreover, arbitral tribunals have criticized
each other for the wrong interpretations that went beyond what the parties had intended
to achieve from this clause.58 In addition, some commentators see that arbitral tribunals
have interpreted investment treaty provisions "in a manner not contemplated by the
original drafting of the parties"59. The dilemma of interpretation has its overwhelming
effects on the international investment law as a dynamic branch of the public
international law, and the MFN clause as an investment treaties provision.

E.

The Distinction between Substantive and Procedural Provisions in BITs:

It is a necessity in this thesis to differentiate between the substantive provisions in a
treaty and another kind of provisions in the same treaty that addressing the jurisdiction
of an arbitral tribunal and confer to it the legal power to resolve disputes arising out of
this treaty.

Public international law and international investment law are familiar with the idea that
the conferral of rights under law is inextricably linked to making available remedies
for their breaches within the same legal system. Hans Kelsen asserted that:
If “rights” are to be conferred on individuals by an international agreement,
the latter must impose upon the states parties to the agreement the
obligation to recognize the jurisdiction of a tribunal to which the
58
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individuals have access in case of a violation of the rights on the part of
the state, as well as the obligation to comply with the decision of the
tribunal…. without subjecting the state to the jurisdiction of a tribunal, no
“rights” of individuals in relation to the state are established.60
The classical approaches of public international law presume that the provisions that
confer jurisdiction to arbitral tribunal are severable from those conferring rights.61
Substantive provisions are the provisions that impose "a certain obligation of a certain
behavior to a state, and determine the lawfulness of a state conduct" 62. Procedural
provisions are the provisions regulating dispute mechanisms in case of the breaching
of the substantive rules, and provide or deny the injured party access to remedy.63 In
other words, procedural rules conferring adjudicative power to an arbitral tribunal to
resolve disputes. A better way to distinguish between these two kinds of rules is to
compare the consequences of non-compliance with them. Non-compliance with a
substantive provision amounts to a wrongful act.64 An investor can claim a violation of
an MFN clause, if the host state granted an investor from a third state more favorable
treatment than what accorded to him in the same circumstances.65 On the other hand,
such a behavior in respect of procedural provisions does not amount to a wrongful act
involving state responsibility.66

In the context of public international law, we can see a clear distinction between
substantive and procedural rules in the practice of the ICJ.67 This practice involves
different subject matter such as the application of the Genocide Convention, law of
self-determination and state immunities. The diversity of these cases "suggests the
universality of the separation line between substantive and procedural rules, and its
status as a core principle of international law"68.

60

See HANS KELSEN, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, 143–144 (Robert W Tucker
trans., 2d ed 1966).
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See Relja Radović, Between Rights and Remedies: The Access to Investment Treaty Arbitration as a
Substantive Right of Foreign Investors, 10 JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL DISPUTE SETTLEMENT. 42, 45
(2019).
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Id.
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See id.
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See id. at 46.
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See id.
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The first element that can be extracted from the practice of the ICJ is the severability
of procedural provisions from substantive provisions in the same treaty.69 This requires
separate assessment to the validity of each set of these two kinds of provisions. For
example, in Fisheries Jurisdiction Case, the court determined the validity of the
procedural rules in the stage of proceedings and determined the validity of substantive
obligations in the merits phase of the case.70 The court affirmed that Iceland’s argument
that the treaty was terminated because of the changed circumstances does not affect its
jurisdiction since such issues belong to the merits phase of the case where the court
would examine the substantive obligations of the treaty parties.71
Secondly, substantive rules cannot affect the procedural rules and vice-versa.72 The ICJ
asserted that substantive obligations contained in the Genocide Convention have no
impact on the jurisdiction of the court in resolving any dispute under the Convention.
The Court ruled as follows:
Rwanda’s reservation to Article IX of the Genocide Convention bears
on the jurisdiction of the Court, and does not affect substantive
obligations relating to acts of genocide themselves under that
Convention. In the circumstances of the present case, the Court cannot
conclude that the reservation of Rwanda in question, which is meant to
exclude a particular method of settling a dispute relating to the
interpretation, application or fulfilment of the Convention, is to be
regarded as being incompatible with the object and purpose of the
Convention. [. . .]
[T]he Court deems it necessary to recall that the mere fact that rights
and obligations erga omnes or peremptory norms of general
international law (jus cogens) are at issue in a dispute cannot in itself
constitute an exception to the principle that its jurisdiction always
depends on the consent of the parties.73
This means that the substantive obligation imposed by the Genocide Convention, which
is to desist from acts of genocide, has no impact on the jurisdictional mandate of the
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Court in resolving disputes arising out of the Convention.74 Each kind of provisions
addresses different things. They are not ejusdem generis.75

Thirdly, the substantive and procedural rules "cannot conflict with each other, and no
conclusion can be derived from one set of rules in respect of the other"76. In
Jurisdictional Immunities of the State, the court recognized the procedural nature of the
rules of immunity.77 It asserted that there was no conflict between the rules of the law
of armed conflict and the rules on state immunity.78 In addition, the Court in Arrest
Warrant asserted that:

In the context of the personal immunities accorded by international law to
foreign ministers), the law of immunity is essentially procedural in nature’,
and ‘it regulates the exercise of jurisdiction in respect of particular conduct
and is thus entirely distinct from the substantive law which determines
whether that conduct is lawful or unlawful.79
The above practice of the ICJ helped us to realize the distinction between procedural
provisions and substantive provisions as a fundamental principal in public international
law. This will help us to understand the relation between MFN clauses and dispute
settlement arrangements in BITs.

In the context of private international law, the distinction between procedural and
substantive provisions is clear.

80

For example, the provisions that confer jurisdiction

to arbitral tribunal are severable from the main contract.81 This means that, the validity
of an arbitration clause, for instance, does not affect the substantive obligations of the
main contract. A claim that a contract is void for illegality does not affect the validity
of an arbitration clause at the same contract. 82 Moreover, the arbitration clause subject
to legal rules that are different from the rules regulating the substantive provisions in
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the main contract.83 The procedural provisions have different purpose and different
legal quality from what the substantive provisions have.

The distinction between the substantive provisions in an investment treaty and the
provisions conferring adjudicative power to arbitral tribunal is straightforward. The
substantive provisions address the contracting state parties. While the procedural
provisions address an international arbitral tribunal and disputing parties. These
disputing parties are not the state parties to BIT, but the investor and the host state.
Both investor and host state "enter into a relationship of procedural equality before the
international tribunal once a dispute has been submitted to it"84. This procedural
relationship subjects to the equality of arms principle in international litigation. 85 This
principle is not respected when one of the disputing parties has the ability to amend the
rules that regulating the jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal after the dispute has arisen.86
The object of the substantive provisions is investments that made by the nationals of
one contracting state on the territory of the other contracting state. The object of
procedural provisions is creating a jurisdictional mandate for an international arbitral
tribunal to settle disputes between the investor and the host state who are in an equal
procedural relationship.87

However, there is another opinion in international investment law sees that there is no
difference between procedural and substantive provisions.88 This opinion asserts that
access to international arbitration is a necessary substantive right that guarantees the
enforcement of the treaty rights.89 Others see that there is an inextricable relation
between the procedural and substantive provisions for the purpose of the protection of
foreign investors and investments.90

The distinction between procedural and substantive provisions in BITs is clear enough
on the eyes of international courts and arbitral tribunals. As we will see in Chapter IV,
83
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the arbitral tribunals that applied MFN clauses to dispute settlement arrangements in
BITs ignored the distinction between procedural and substantive rules to ensure the
excessive protection of the foreign investment and investors. In other words, it seems
that arbitral tribunals ignore this distinction when they want to apply MFN clauses to
dispute settlement provisions in BITs. This vision relies on the purpose of investment
protection. In contrast, arbitral tribunals that recognized the distinction between
procedural and substantive rules are the tribunals that refused the application of the
MFN clause to dispute settlement arrangements without a prior clear consent of the
host state. Many arbitral tribunals have recognized the distinction between the
substantive and procedural provisions as a general principle in public international
law.91 With respect to states, their practice before arbitral tribunals asserts the
distinction between procedural and substantive rules. Moreover, if we accepted the
right to access international arbitration as a substantive right, the failure to do so by the
host state would amount to a wrongful act involving state responsibility.92 In the same
Vein, Consular jurisdiction in the past was considered essential for the protection of
the foreigners' rights and their property. However, we cannot say that this form of
extraterritorial jurisdiction is of the same nature of the substantive rights of the foreign
investors and it is necessary to the investment protection. The necessity of any
procedural rules should not change its nature as procedural rules.

I believe that dispute settlement arrangements are procedural rules that are different
from substantive rules in BITs. The procedural provisions cannot be given a substantive
character. This distinction appears clearly in the practice of the ICJ in the context of
public international law. However, some arbitral tribunals try to take some steps
towards connecting procedural and substantive rules in pursuance of the legitimization
of the wrong interpretations. Neither the protection of foreign investments, nor the
legitimization of the wrong interpretations should change the nature of the procedural
rules in BITs. The final aim of considering dispute settlement provisions as part of the
substantive and not the procedural provisions, is to give these clauses one-side oriented
interpretation, investor oriented, and gave the ultimate effect to facilitate the access to
international arbitration to guarantee excessive protection to interests and rights of
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investors. With respect to MFN clause, treaty parties had not intended to expand its
scope, as a treaty provision, under the will of the investors.

F.

Contemporary Practice Regarding the MFN Clauses in GATT and the

WTO:

It will be useful to address the question of the MFN clause more broadly to include its
interpretation and application in fields other than international investment law. This
clause has became the corner stone of the multilateral trading system. Under article I
of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), most favored nation is granted
to the goods of other GATT contracting states “immediately and unconditionally” at
the border. Under the requirement of article III of the GATT, "national treatment" shall
be provided to these goods as soon as they enter the domestic market of any of
contracting parties. 93 The immediate and unconditional applications of most favored
nation together with national treatment constitute the core principle of nondiscrimination under GATT.94 Under article II of the General Agreement on Trade in
Services (GATS), the MFN obligation is applicable to any measure that affects trade
in services in any field covered by this agreement.95 The importance of MFN treatment
to GATT lays in the avoiding of discrimination in the application of tariffs and other
treatment accorded to goods when they crossed borders.96 The WTO has extend the
scope of the application of the MFN clause from the application in trade in goods to
trade in services and the protection of intellectual property rights.97

By reviewing the way in which MFN treatment had been applied in the GATT and
WTO, we can determine the scope of its application within the WTO system through
the recognition of five elements.
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First, despite the fact that MFN provisions in the WTO are worded differently, the
approach of the Appellate Body deals with them as they have the same meaning.98 The
textual interpretation to MFN provisions is less importance than the underlying concept
of MFN treatment.

Second, the Appellate Body has interpreted MFN treatment under GATT article I in a
manner that gave it the broadest possible application. The Appellate Body asserted that
"any" advantages, favor, privilege or immunity means "any advantage". The Appellate
Body's words are as follows:

[W]e note next that Article I:1 requires that "any advantage, favour, privilege
or immunity granted by any Member to any product originating in or destined
for any other country shall be accorded immediately and unconditionally to
the like product originating in or destined for the territories of all other
Members." (emphasis added) The words of Article I:1 refer not to some
advantages granted "with respect to" the subjects that fall within the defined
scope of the Article, but to "any advantage"; not to some products, but to "any
product "; and not to like products from some other Members, but to like
products originating in or destined for "all other" Members.99
Although, the Appellate Body adopted the broadest possible application to MFN
treatment, 'The specific issue of whether MFN treatment applies to both substantive
and procedural rights has not been addressed by the Appellate Body"100.

Third, although MFN treatment within the WTO system was meant to be unconditional,
all of the WTO agreements contain exceptions to the application of MFN treatment to
the extent that its application is more restricted than it appears. "Exceptions for customs
unions and free trade areas, for safeguards and other trade remedies, as well as general
See Appellate Body Report, European Communities —Regime for the Importation, Sale and
Distribution of Bananas, WT/DS27/AB/R para 231 (Sep. 9, 1998) (adopted 25 September 1997).
The Appellate Body asserted that:
[T]he Panel interpreted Article II of the GATS in the light of panel reports interpreting the national
treatment obligation of Article III of the GATT. The Panel also referred to Article XVII of the GATS,
which is also a national treatment obligation. But Article II of the GATS relates to MFN treatment, not
to national treatment. Therefore, provisions elsewhere in the GATS relating to national treatment
obligations, and previous GATT practice relating to the interpretation of the national treatment
obligation of Article III of the GATT 1994 are not necessarily relevant to the interpretation of Article II
of the GATS. The Panel would have been on safer ground had it compared the MFN obligation in Article
II of the GATS with the MFN and MFN-type obligations in the GATT 1994."
99
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exceptions and provisions for special and differential treatment" 101 all work as a
limitation to the scope of MFN treatment under the WTO agreements.

Fourth, the particular nature of the WTO system, with its own agreement and dispute
settlement process to interpret and apply these agreements means that there is a limited
relation between the interpretation and application of the MFN clause within the WTO
and its interpretation and application in other agreements.102 Therefore, the
interpretation and application of MFN treatment within the WTO has its own scope
regardless how MFN clauses are treated in other agreements such as BITs.103

Fifth, with respect to the application of the MFN clause in GATS, trade in service under
GATS includes providing by a supplier of one state member through natural persons
on the territory of another state member. Article II of GATS shall regulate the MFN
treatment that is accorded to this services supplier.

The question is whether a WTO member can rely on Article II of GATS to benefit from
the provisions of BIT between another a WTO member and a third state that provides
favorable measures to the service suppliers of this third State. The study group of the
International Law Commission has found no answer to this question on practice or
jurisprudence.104

I believe that interpretation in the Appellate Body's view is "to clarify the meaning of
existing obligations, not to modify their content"105. In addition, the interpretation and
application of the MFN treatment within the WTO system do not raise any problem.
Moreover, there is no practice of the WTO Appellate Body on the application of the
MFN clause to the procedural rights of the WTO members .The WTO has its own
mechanism for resolving disputes. Although, the WTO agreements are interpreted
based on Articles 31 and 32 of the VCLT, the existence of the appellate structure
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ensures that the interpretations of the panel, in respect of the MFN clause, can be
rethought or abolished.106

G.

The Proponents and Dissenters to the Application of the MFN Clause to

Dispute Settlement Provisions in BITs:

There are two-conflict interests that affect the scope of the application of the MFN
clause with respect to dispute settlement provisions in BITs. The application of this
clause to dispute settlement arrangements responds to the interest of the investors. This
facilitates and broadens the scope of access to international arbitration that offers
international protection to investors who benefit from procedural provisions that are
contained in other BITs. This could be happened by overriding procedures
requirements to access international arbitration or expand the jurisdiction of arbitral
tribunals to matters beyond these specifically stated in the basic BIT. This protection
cannot be granted by domestic courts that, in some opinions, lack to the sufficient
independence to judge against their governments. On the other hand, the respondent
state seeks to limit the jurisdiction of international tribunals and denies any effects to
the MFN clause in respect of dispute settlement arrangements, fearing about being held
responsible for breaching a treaty obligation or being sanctioned.

The answer of the question of whether the MFN clause should be applied to disputes
settlement provisions in BITs or not, found many proponents and many dissenters.
Each of them adopts arguments that present the case from his point of view and no one
of them can claim a numerical supremacy of supporters. The proponents argue that the
MFN clause should be applied to dispute settlement provisions in BITs. The dissenters
argue that the MFN clause should not be applied to dispute settlement provisions in
BITs.
The proponents argue that,107 once the MFN clause existed in BIT, it should be applied
to matters of dispute settlement provisions, since there are no differences between
procedural and substantive provisions in BIT. They assert that there is an inextricable
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link between procedural and substantive provisions, and procedural provisions are of
the same nature of the substantive provisions. Therefore, the MFN clause should be
applied to procedural provisions as it is applied to substantive provisions. Second,
dispute settlement provisions are necessary for the enforcement of the investors' treaty
rights. Third, all BIT's provisions are negotiated between the host state and the investor,
so there is no need to differentiate between the MFN clause and other provisions.
Fourth, the ability to choose between varieties of dispute settlement provisions in itself
is a favored treatment, to let the investor to choose what he desire. Finally, the
application of the MFN clause would lead to the harmonization of international
investment law through linking large number of BITs in relation to dispute settlement
provisions. Since, the MFN clause incorporate procedural provisions from other state's
BITs to the procedural provisions in the basic BIT.
Dissenters argue that108 the MFN clause should be applied only to substantive rights
not procedural rights, so it cannot be applied to dispute settlement provisions since they
are procedural rights. Second, to apply the MFN clause to dispute settlement provisions
it has to extend, explicitly, its application to matters of dispute settlement and defines
the references of the incorporation of these procedural provisions from other BITs.
Third, there is no doubt that the dispute settlement provisions had been negotiated
carefully between the parties. Therefore, dispute settlement provisions should not be
incorporated from other BITs. Finally, in international investment arbitration
precedents are not of binding nature whether to tribunals or states. Therefore, the
application of the MFN clause to dispute settlement arrangements may lead to more
conflicting investment rules and treaty shopping rather than the harmonization of
dispute settlement mechanisms.

H.

Conclusion:

In this chapter, I have explored the evolution of the investment protection from the
early political communities to the recent practices of international courts and arbitral
tribunals that clarify the framework of the MFN clause and the impact of this
framework on the interests of both foreign investors and host states.
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In section one, I have demonstrated how interpretation of the MFN clause in relation
to its application to dispute settlement arrangements in BITs is not a today issue. In
fact, it is not the first nor will be the latest "episode" in a long history of a constant
demand of foreigners to prevent domestic courts to hear their cases and instead seek
the assurance of an international or internationalized forum. The legal position of the
aliens has in the progress of time advanced from the complete outlawry, in the days of
the early Rome and the German tribes, to the practical assimilation with nationals, at
the present time. Diplomatic protection proved to be one of the notorious forms of
protecting aliens abroad since the exercise of this protection by powerful states was
accompanied by "gun-boat diplomacy". Moreover, the exercise of this protection
depended on many things like the merits of the claim or geopolitical interests that might
be affected by the making of a claim.

With the existence of the colonial political and legal regimes, there was no need to
powerful countries to recourse to international law process to protect their nationals.
Extraterritorial jurisdiction allowed powerful states to apply their laws to their nationals
in foreign states. Egypt is a concrete example of this practice. This extraterritorial
jurisdiction was embodied in the Mixed Courts and Consular Courts that were about a
set of privileges granted to the nationals of certain countries who were exempted from
the application of domestic laws and the jurisdiction of domestic courts. After the
termination of the Consular Courts and Mixed Courts, the obligations upon host states
towards foreigners and their interests were and still imposed by international norms.
Developing states have become parties to many BITs to protect reciprocal flows of
foreign investment. In reality, this protection is for one-way flows of foreign
investment that happened from developed and powerful countries to developing
countries. Moreover, the scope of this protection is enhanced by the expansive and
wrong interpretations that produced by arbitral tribunals. This resulted in a profusion
of the awards and decisions of arbitral tribunals that give affirm and articulate the
principles of investment protection that work as an immunity against the jurisdiction
of the domestic courts in the host states. With the diverse and the constantly changing
of the international environment, no one can predict the future of dispute settlement
mechanisms in respect of international investment disputes.
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In section two, I have explained the historical background of the MFN clause from the
Bilateral Treaties of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation (FCN treaties) to the recent
practices that have led us to the current legal situation. In addition, how the
overwhelming proliferation of BITs and resorting to dispute settlement mechanisms
have given the MFN clause a new lease on life.

In section three, I have explored the definition of the MFN clause and the important
elements that characterized this clause. First, this clause prohibits host states from
discriminating against persons "investors" or things "investments" of a state and a third
state. Second, the MFN clause is applied where the "investors or investments" of the
beneficiary state is in the same relation of the third state with the host state. Third, the
investor receives less favorable treatment than the host state provides to, the
comparators, the third state. Fourth, states' obligations under the MFN clause are
strictly treaty obligation, therefore it is a treaty provision as any treaty provision; it can
be restricted to specific kinds of treatment, based on the intentions of the treaty parties.

In section four, I have explained the scope of the application of the MFN clause. The
determination of this scope is matter of treaty interpretation. Arbitral tribunals used to
apply these clauses only to substantive provisions in BITs. The tribunal's decision in
Maffezini was the starting point in expanding the application of this clause to dispute
settlement arrangements in BITs. Practitioners, civil societies and states have criticized
the arbitral tribunals for the inconsistent and unintended interpretations of MFN
clauses. Some arbitral tribunal interpreted the MFN clause in manner not contemplated
by the original drafting to expand the scope of the application of this clause to matters
of dispute settlement in BITs.

In section five, I have demonstrated that the distinction between substantive and
procedural provisions is straightforward in public international law, private
international law and international investment law. Generally, non-compliance with a
substantive provision amounts to a wrongful act, in contrast, such a behavior in respect
of procedural provisions does not amount to a wrongful act involving state
responsibility. Therefore, if we accepted the right to access international arbitration as
a substantive right, the failure to do so by the host state would amount to a wrongful
act involving state responsibility. Although, the distinction between procedural and
27

substantive provisions in BITs is clear enough on the eyes of international courts and
arbitral tribunals, some of them try to take some steps towards connecting procedural
and substantive rules in pursuance of the legitimization of the wrong interpretations.
These tribunals ignore this distinction when they want to apply MFN clauses to dispute
settlement provisions in BITs to grant excessive protection to foreign investment. In
fact, neither the protection of foreign investments, nor the legitimization of the wrong
interpretations should change the nature of the procedural rules in BITs.

In section six, I have addressed the question of the MFN clause more broadly to include
its interpretation and application in GATT and the WTO. Despite the fact that MFN
provisions in the WTO are worded differently, the approach of the Appellate Body
deals with them as they have the same meaning. Although, the Appellate Body has
interpreted MFN treatment under GATT article I in a manner that gave it the broadest
possible application, the Appellate Body has not addressed the issue of the application
of the MFN clause to procedural provisions. The interpretation and application of the
MFN treatment within the WTO system do not raise any problem. Moreover, the
existence of the appellate structure ensures that the interpretations of the panel, in
respect of the MFN clause, can be rethought or abolished.

In section seven, I have explored the conflict interests that affect - or affected by - the
application of the MFN clause to dispute settlement arrangements in BITs. The
application of this clause to dispute settlement provisions responds to the interests of
foreign since it facilitates and broadens the scope of access to international arbitration
that offers international protection to investors who benefit from procedural provisions
that are contained in other BITs. This could be happened by overriding procedures
requirements to access international arbitration or expand the jurisdiction of arbitral
tribunals to matters beyond these specifically stated in the basic BIT. This could be
happened by overriding procedures requirements to access international arbitration or
expand the jurisdiction of arbitral tribunals to matters beyond these specifically stated
in the basic BIT. On the other hand, the respondent state seeks to limit the jurisdiction
of international tribunals and denies any effects to the MFN clause in respect of dispute
settlement arrangements, fearing about being held responsible for breaching a treaty
obligation or being sanctioned. Then I have explained briefly the arguments of the
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proponents and dissenters of the application of the MFN clause to dispute settlement
provisions in BITs.

In sum, I have explored the complete picture of the background and framework of the
application of the MFN clause to matters of dispute settlement in BITs. The
interpretation of this clause plays an important role in determining the scope of its
application. In fact, the debate about the scope of the application of the MFN clause to
dispute settlement provisions in BITs, is about how this clause should be interpreted.
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II.

The International Rules of Interpretation in the VCLT

Understanding the role and significance of each rule of the interpretation rules is an
indispensable criterion of the proper application of these rules and the proper
interpretation of the BITs' provisions. Arbitral tribunals rarely justify their adopted
interpretation, but they just refer to Articles 31 and 32 of the VCLT. Maybe they do
not have to justify their adopted interpretation, since they have the power to provide
binding interpretations. The methods of the application of the international rules on
treaty interpretation have attract less attention rather than the concluded interpretations.
For example, a study of the UNCTAD of the application of the MFN clause to matters
of dispute settlement affirmed that this clause should be interpreted according to
Articles 31 of the VCLT, however, it did not discuss how these articles should be
applied.109

The world of any human or legal person consists of normative universes. These
universes structured around the possibility of right or wrong, of lawful or unlawful or
of valid or void. International law is one of these normative universes. It includes rules
and restrictions that validate or invalidate certain practices or construct a certain reality.
Therefore, interpretation is a process that in fact may lead to correct and incorrect
conclusions.

In additions, each of the objective and subjective approaches has his own different
approaches to treaty interpretation, so which approach should adjudicators followed.
Moreover, the hierarchical order of the means of interpretation is a subject of debate
that has not been solved. In addition, many BITs lack to the textual determinacy to the
extent that tribunals struggle in interpreting the BIT's provision. How could tribunals
interpret the silence of some texts is another unresolved problem. For all these reasons,
the application of these interpretative rules is a dilemma. This chapter argues that the
problem of interpretation is not crystalized in the availability of the means of
interpretation, but in the misapplication of the available means of interpretation.
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Section one of this chapter demonstrates the nature of treaty interpretation, and how it
is not an exact science, but it is still a science. This science requires the application of
certain rules to produce correct results. The second section explains treaty
interpretation from the perspective of the objective and subjective approaches. The
third section provides an analysis of Articles 31 and 32 of the VCLT and the arbitral
use of these articles in interpreting investment treaties. This analysis includes the
general rule of interpretation, the supplementary means of interpretation, the
interpretation of the silence of a treaty text and the hierarchal order among the
international means of interpretation in the VCLT.

A.

The Nature of the Treaty Interpretation:

Treaty interpretation is a part of public international law, since treaties are concluded
between states as the entities of international law. These treaties are not parchments or
words carved on a stone. They are instruments that ought to provide the legal stability
to their parties with respect to the purpose of each treaty. The provisions of these
treaties predict the future, potential legal situations and new factual. In order to
determine the treaty rights and obligations, its parties need to define the accurate
meaning of these provisions. The determination of this correct legal meaning is the
ultimate aim of the interpretation process. However, the determination of this meaning
is a dilemma. Sometimes a treaty provision provides no accurate meaning, which raises
the question of how to determine the correct legal meaning of this provision.

With respect to the concept of interpretation, it can be described as "the process of
determining the meaning" or "the giving of meaning to a text"110. The mainstream of
scholars defines interpretation as "meaning ascertainment, yet also see it as serving a
wider purpose"111. "Interpretation in international law essentially refers to the process
of assigning meaning to texts and other statements for the purposes of establishing
rights, obligations.... Interpretation is both a cognitive and a creative process".112
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Other sees that "interpretation is a secondary process which only comes into play when
it is impossible to make sense of the plain terms of the treaty, or when they are
susceptible of different meanings".113 "The way the word is used in the 1969 Vienna
Convention" affirms that "only when we have already read a text, and the text has
shown to be unclear, that we can say that we then interpret it".114

Other warns that interpretation is a multidimensional process and it can be broad or
restrictive. This process can expand the universe of international law by legitimizing
or qualifying norms that were not previously considered as rules of international law.115
Interpretation also can broaden the scope of the application of existing rules or expand
the content of these rules.116 Conversely, interpretation can deprive a legal rule of any
legal pedigree, or strip it of any meaningful content.117 Consequently, this opinion sees
that interpretation is a multidimensional process that includes; the determination of the
content of the legal rule and the identification of legal rules that are available by public
international law.118 Therefore, our understanding of treaty interpretation should not be
limited to content-determination.119

The mainstream of international legal scholarship has promoted a predominantly rulebased approach to interpretation in public international law, and the VCLT provides
this overall model. It provides formal rules that govern treaty interpretation and operate
as formal constraints on the interpretive freedom.120

The 2006 ILC Report employs another strain of argument. It asserters that
interpretation is a process of giving a justifiable meaning to the text, but it is not an
actual description of a psychological process. "The starting-point is the treaty itself,
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with interpretation proceeding from the more concrete and obvious (dictionary,
context), to the less tangible and less obvious (object and purpose, analogous treaties
etc.) in order to give the text a justifiable meaning".121
Other asserts that interpretation is "the applicative construction of law’s meaning. That
is to say, interpretation is an effort to guide the concretization of abstract general norms
in individual instances, foremost in the process of rendering tribunal judgments".122

From the previous definitions, we can distinguish between two fundamentally different
conceptions of interpretation.123 First, interpretation is the process of finding out what
the treaty texts mean or what the parties to a treaty want its texts to express.124 In other
words, it not more than what jurists do when they understand the meaning of any treaty
provision. Second, the conception of interpretation is unclear within international legal
scholarship and practice.125 However, we can say that the second conception of
interpretation as used by international lawyers is more than meaning ascertainment.
Interpretation, according to the second conception, is a creative act that provides the
interpreter with choices and the rules of interpretation are the sources of these
choices.126

The legal theory can help us to find out what exactly interpretation can be. Although,
the doctrinal thinking on international law is theory-averse, avoiding theory makes the
doctrine of interpretation impractical.127 The theoretical "ad hoc" or a single theory for
each single case or even a single theory for a single arbitral tribunal inevitably leads to
inconsistency and failing arguments.128 It will be useful in this thesis to use the pure
theory of law to recognize what the legal interpretation is. Indeed, this theory is the best
place to provide us with the theoretical foundation of interpretation.
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For Hans Kelsen, interpretation is "a mental process which accompanies law-making
in its progress from the higher to the lower stages".129 Interpretation is linked with the
hierarchical structure of the legal order.130 According to the structured order in the
kelsenian prospective, the higher-order norm cannot fully determine all the contents of
the lower norm, and the lower norm cannot be logically derived from the higher
norm.131 The lower norm as a positive law needs an act of will to be created, and must
not contradict the higher norm.132 Kelsen asserts, "If by interpretation we mean
determining the sense of the norm which is to be put into effect, the result of that
activity can only be to determine the frame which is presented by the norm".133
According to Kelsen, we must acknowledge the possibility of a diversity of the results
of interpretation within the frame of a norm. Therefore, the interpretation of a text need
not inevitably to lead to a solely single decision as the only correct one, but it may lead
to several results that each of them have - insofar as they confirm the higher norm- the
same equal value.134

Interpretation in the Kelsenian thinking resulted in a lower-level norm that decided by
an authorized organ who decides only the frame of possible meanings for us. If an
interpreter imports external standers such as "morals, justice or political ideologies, one
imports something that is not part of positive law and hence ‘justiﬁes’ one’s decision
by a standard incommensurate with legal scholarship’s exclusive focus on law."135 The
judicial decision would be well grounded on law only when the adopted interpretation
is one of these possible results within the frame prescribed the higher norm.136
Moreover, he calls for the development of the methods of interpretation to enable the
correct content of the frame to be precisely determined.137

Kelsen rejects the idea that new norms can be made by means of elucidation from the
higher norms or already existing norms.138 In other words, we cannot use interpretation
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to create new norms within the legal system. He sees that the function of interpretation
is to discover the meaning from the existing norms.139 In addition, he refuses to assign
a special role to interpretation in the case of legal gaps, since these gaps must not be
filled by interpretation.140 Kelsen affirms that a legal dispute can be decided based on
a valid norm and the non-existence of this norm has to lead to the disposing of this
dispute.141 The decision of confirming or disposing of a claim made by a party to a
treaty against another party depends on whether law declares it a legal duty or not, since
there is no a third possibility. When a person does not obliged by law to do a certain
behavior, he is free to do or not to do what he is not obliged to do.142 Moreover,
interpretation has nothing to do with the non-existence of an obligation. Kelsen called
this as a negative norm that "operates in a decision disposing of a claim directed to a
behavior which is not a statutory duty"143.

One aspect of Kelsen's frame theorem is worth discussing for the purpose of our
analysis. The Kelsen's frame theorem recognizes the possibility of the existence of
correct meanings. The theory did not decide how we could choose between those
meanings in case they are different things. 144 The determination of the frame raises
another question; how do we determine the frame, what it looks like and how many
possible meanings can be within the frame. However, the theory helps us to determine
the relation between the outcomes of the interpretation process and the treaty texts.

The world of any human or legal person consists of normative universes. These
universes structured around the possibility of right or wrong, of lawful or unlawful, of
valid or void, or permissible or impermissible.145 International law is one of these
normative universes and it has developed rules that regulate treaty interpretation. These
rules of interpretation validate or invalidate certain practices or construct a certain
reality.146 Treaty interpretation operates within this normative universe and within the
framework of pre-existing rules that have to be followed. The rules of interpretation
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determine the way we go about interpretation - or ought to go about it – and this is
essential to what can be achieved by arbitral tribunals and ad hoc committees147.

Recent contributions to treaty interpretation agree that the VCLT rules, including the
rules of interpretation in Articles 31 to 33, are binding law that applicable as a treaty
and as customary international law.148 We can say that treaty interpretation subjects to
certain rules that aim to conduct the behavior of interpreters in respect of the
determination of the meaning of a treaty provisions. These rules are the product of the
international community and must be respected by this community. Interpretation
cannot neither change the law nor capable of creating new legal rules within the legal
system. Interpretation is a reproduction of a legal norm and can never go beyond or
contradict the original norm.149

One may ask whether applying the interpretation rules of the VCLT would result in
correct interpretation. I believe that arbitral tribunals are bound to apply and give effect
to the interpretation rules.150 Moreover, interpretation is a process that in fact may lead
to correct and incorrect conclusions. The interpretation rules serve as a common
framework that guarantees a uniform arbitral interpretation practice of arbitral tribunals
and ad hoc committees.151 Article 31 of the VCLT provides a compulsory general rule
and some flexibility and discretion lies in Article 32.152 Article 31 of the VCLT
provides four elements and this Article is expressed in mandatory terms.153 This Article
is designed to be applied within a single and integrated process of treaty interpretation.
"Article 31 of the VCLT is entitled the "General rule of interpretation not the "General
rules of interpretation" and the significance of this is often overlooked".154

The full compliance with the rules of interpretation will produce correct results and
will resolve the problem of wrong interpretations that go beyond the clear meaning of
the treaty texts.155 Conversely, "the neglect and misapplication of these customary rules
147
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would defeat their objectives, make adjudicators’ interpretation illegitimate."156 The
problem of interpretation is not crystalized in the availability of interpretational means,
but in the misapplication of the available interpretational means.

A crucial question in determining the nature of interpretation is whether treaty
interpretation is a science or an art. This issue had appeared before the drafting of the
VCLT when the ILC said, "the interpretation of documents is to some extent, an art not
an exact science"157. When the Special Rapporteur Sir Humphrey Waldock was
working on the first draft of the Law of Treaties, he informed the ILC members, at the
726th meeting, that "the subject was a vast and difficult one and he was anxious not to
penetrate too deeply into the realm of logic and what might be described as the art of
interpretation".158

If the statement of the ILC is correct and interpretation is an art and not a science, this
would mean that achieving certainty in interpretation is a utopian dream. Moreover,
academics, lawyers, adjudicators and judges would be artists and not legal scientists
and judicial decisions would be works of art not products of a legal science.159

If we describe interpretation as an art, then it is a kind of antithesis to "exact science".
This reveals the use of the epithet ‘exact’ to characterize science. 160 The ILC sees that
interpretation as an art is unlike science, where there are rules that predetermined the
exact outcomes of any interpretational process. Therefore, interpretation cannot be
captured in certain rules or regulated be them and the prediction of the outcomes of any
interpretation process is impossible. In this opinion, interpretation lacks any
deterministic process.

The results of this opinion are dangerous to extent that the outcomes of any
interpretation process will be correct. These results are works of art. Moreover, there
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will be no rules that determine whether the results of treaty interpretation are correct or
wrong.
The idea of science as "exact" does not correspond to the legal reality at all.161 Even in
physics, which is an exact science according to the notion of the ILC, there is always a
"margin of error".162 Moreover, we cannot chastise interpretation for a shortcoming, as
uncertainty, that may be existed in the exact sciences.

International courts and arbitral tribunals always refer to the rules of interpretation of
the Vienna Convention on the law of treaties and this is a sufficient evidence that there
is a tendency to highlight the science element in treaty interpretation. The fact that
many international courts and arbitral tribunals may or may not correctly apply
interpretation rules will not turns the nature of treaty interpretation from a science to
an art.

Interpretation is regulated by Articles 31-33 of the VCLT, which are binding to
adjudicators and treaty parties. Therefore, all international courts and tribunals either
explicitly or implicitly follow the process of treaty interpretation enshrined in these
articles. These rules are sufficient to achieve legal certainty.163 The ultimate aim of
treaty interpretation, according to the VCLT, is to determine the binding and correct
legal meaning of the treaty provisions according to the communicative intention of the
treaty parties, and what they want the treaty provisions to express.164 According to
Article 31/4 of the VCLT, an ordinary meaning shall be given to the treaty provisions
unless it is established that the parties had intended to give a different meaning to these
provisions.165 The proliferation of international adjudication that has reached
unprecedented heights should not affect the function and normative content of the rules
of interpretation in the VCLT. This diverse and constantly changing international
environment should not turn interpretation from a science that is regulated by certain
rules to an art that governed by no rules.
161
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Although, interpretation is not an exact science, it is still a science requiring the
application of particular rules to produce correct results.166 The VCLT puts limits for
the creativeness and discretion of adjudicators to ensure that their findings do not
counter the intent of the state parties that is expressed by the treaty texts.167 Therefore,
we have to assert the scientific nature of treaty interpretation as an activity, since at the
end it subjects to certain rules.
In addition, science and art are not mutually exclusive.168 I believe that interpretation
is a science, that is, artful. Interpretation requires the application of a set of
predetermined rules and the correct application of these rules will result in correct
outcomes. Conversely, the neglect or the misapplication of these rules will result in
wrong interpretations.

The application of legal rules needs many qualifications and experience. This what
justifies that there are persons who are able to do some things better than the others are.
This means that the application of a science to some extent needs an art. This truth
should not refute the nature of treaty interpretation as a science that regulated by a
certain binding rules. Moreover, it should not refute the artful nature of interpretation
as a science that needs a scientific knowledge for the determination of the correct
meaning of the treaty texts. However, the artful nature of interpretation as a science
does not mean that interpretation processes are free of any constraints or rules to
regulate. We need the art to apply correctly the rules of interpretation as a science. We
can say that treaty interpretation is a science, that is, artful.

B.

Treaty Interpretation According to the Subjective and Objective

Approaches of International Law:

Each of the objective and subjective approaches has different answer to the question of
why treaties are binding. According to the subjective approach, treaties are binding
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because they express the mutual consent of their parties. 169 According to the objective
approach, treaties are binding because of the consideration of good faith, teleology,
reciprocity or justice considerations. These conflicting answers affected the visions of
these two approaches in relation to treaty interpretation. Indeed, the history of treaty
interpretation is a reflection of the conflict between the objective and subjective
approaches.

Case law and international tribunals emphasize the priority of the "natural", "ordinary",
"usual" or "normal" meaning. Interpretation process of treaties has to produce this
meaning.170 This "ordinary" meaning of treaty provisions seems the relevant meaning
since it is the most reliable evidence of what the treaty parties have consented to what
bound them. Moreover, justice requires the enforcement of what the treaty parties had
consented to.171 However, the doctrine of "normal" meaning fails to produce a
comprehensive solution when a treaty text can produce more than one "normal"
meaning. Moreover, the "normal" meaning itself needs an interpretation. The existence
of disputes about what the normal meaning is proves the failure of the normal meaning
doctrine as a comprehensive solution to treaty interpretation.

The overriding force of the "normal meaning" varies from the subjective to the
objective understanding. According to the subjective understanding, the original intent
of the treaty parties is the primary element of interpretation and overrides the "normal
meaning" if they conflict with each other.172 The subjective understanding,
"consensualism" and positivism believe that the original intents of the treaty parties are
cornerstone of treaty interpretation. They see the treaty as the world of its parties, what
are inside this treaty is relevant based on the intent of the treaty parties. They do not
give any effects to any interpretations that apart from this original intent. In their
approach, treaties bind because it is the reflection of the mutual consent of their parties.
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According to the objective understanding, "normal meaning" is a secondary element of
interpretation.173 They assert that treaties bind because of the considerations of good
faith, teleology, reciprocity or justice considerations.174 Treaty interpretation in this
approach should not be limited by the meaning of the words of the treaty texts. These
texts can be interpreted in the light of many things outside the treaty provisions. They
affirm that the treaties as a source of public international law are something higher than
the intent of their parties. As a result, any interpretation based on consideration such as
good faith, teleology, reciprocity or justice overrides "normal meaning".175

The "normal" meaning cannot be determined independently without a base of the
parties' intent or good faith and justice, since there is no independent normative
character to that normal meaning.176 Normal meaning is the correct meaning as it is
reasonable according to parties' intent or something higher than this intent such as good
faith or legitimate expectations, etc.

The problem of "normal meaning' with the subjective understanding is that the goal of
interpretation is to give effect to the intentions of parties. However, we cannot use the
parties' intentions as a mean to attain interpretation. Under this understanding, we
should exclude any objective points about the text such as teleology, good faith or
subsequent conduct etc. The only mean of interpretation we have is what the treaty
parties had consented on, how consent can be used as a mean to argue and support
treaty interpretation, how can the goal used as a mean. If the subjective approach uses
means such as good faith, teleology, subsequent practices, etc. then it will be
indistinguishable from the objective understanding.

With respect to the objective approach, it provides no solution for determining the
"normal meaning". This approach begins from an assumption that the parties' intentions
are not known and we cannot justify an interpretation by referring to these intentions.177
This approach denies the existence of "objective normality" as well as the existence of
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non-subjective criterion that can evaluate the mutual treaty rights and obligations.178
The objective approach affirms that the treaty interpretation must not be limited by the
intentions of the parties, but there is something beyond this intention. Treaties can be
interpreted in the light of legitimate expectations, justice considerations, teleology, etc.

Although, these two approaches, subjective and objective, are opposing each other,
both of them are necessary to determine the proper meaning of the treaty provisions. A
subject interpretation can be supported by objective elements; the intentions of the
treaty parties can be determined by moving into the objective understanding and the
objective argument can held under the subjective understanding. The doctrine of treaty
interpretation cannot follows constantly the subjective and objective understandings.
Interpretation shifts from a subjective approach to an objective approach vice-versa and
adjudicators stop only in the point where they find that this interpretation is the
reflection of what the parties had consented to. International courts and arbitral
tribunals show that there is no conflict between these two understandings and they do
not characterize their interpretation by anything, subjective or objective approach,
except that this is what every states party to a treaty had consented to.

C.

The Analysis of Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of

Treaties and the Arbitral Use of these Articles to Interpret BITs:

Principles, methods, rules, etc. are legal terms that describe the content of Articles 31
and 32 of the VCLT. These articles contain ways of weighing and choosing the
evidence of interpretation. The evidence of the intentions of the parties can be found in
the text of a treaty, preparatory work, preamble and annexes. The evidence of
understanding can be found in subsequent agreements after the conclusion of a treaty
and the subsequent practices of a treaty. Although, the borders between the two kinds
of evidence are not always clear, they may result in competing interpretations.
Moreover, there are elements that may affect the understanding of the texts such as the
circumstances of a treaty conclusion, the applicable rules of international law and treaty
object and purpose.
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Arbitral tribunals have to apply Articles 31 and 32 of the VCLT, because VCLT is a
binding treaty upon the BIT's parties or it is a manifestation of the customary
international rules of interpretation. These articles include the concepts such as original
meaning of the text, context, object and purpose, subsequent agreements and practices.
However, the method of the application of these rules is a dilemma. These rules provide
a balance approach to treaty interpretation that recognizes equally the legitimate rights
and interests of the host states and foreign investors. This balance can be reached only
if each means of these interpretative means has been given its particular value,
according to the VCLT. These means should be applied as defined under the VCLT, to
avoid the problem of liberal interpretation of a treaty in the light of its object and
purpose. The problem of interpretation is not crystalized in the availability of
interpretational means, but in the misapplication of the available means of
interpretation.

The first part of this section discusses the elements that consist the general rule of
interpretation. The second part provides the supplementary means of interpretation.
The third part explores the interpretation of the silence of a treaty provision. The fourth
part provides the hierarchical order among the means of interpretation in the VCLT.

1.

The General Rule of Interpretation According to Article 31 of the VCLT:

Article 31 of the VCLT expresses an integrated single rule of interpretation that
contains specified elements. These elements are; good faith, the terms of a treaty,
context, treaty object and purpose, subsequent agreements between the parties,
subsequent practice of the application of the treaty and the relevant rules of
international law.179

Adjudicators are bound to apply this rule since the previous Article uses the phrase "a
treaty shall be interpreted …..." which affirm the mandatory nature of the application
of these means. These means are of the same equal weight, since the paragraphs of
Article 31 does not refer to a legal hierarchy of them. However, these separate
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paragraphs reflect the logic and natural progress of the process of interpretation.180
Interpretation should starts with the text of the treaty, then the context, object and
purpose and then the external elements that indicate the meaning of the text and reflect
the intentions of the parties.181

According to Article 31 (1), the general rule of interpretation is based on the textual
approach.182 This is the starting point for the interpretation of a treaty, to clarify the
meaning of the text. This based on the assumption that the text reflects and expresses
the intentions of the treaty parties, rather than any external factors.

According to Article 31 (1) of the VCLT, "a treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in
accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their
context and in the light of its object and purpose"183. This paragraph contains three
principles of interpretation and combines these separate principles in one rule of
interpretation.184 The first principle is to interpret a treaty in good faith. This principle
flows directly from the rule "pacta sunt servanda"185. The second principle, which is
the very essence of the textual approach, is that an interpretation has to reflect the
ordinary meaning of the text, which is the opposite of the special meaning.186 The third
principle is that this ordinary meaning has to be determined in the light of the text,
context and the object and purpose of a treaty.187

The ICJ in its Advisory Opinion on the Competence of the General Assembly for the
Admission of a State to the United Nations affirmed that:

[T]he Court considers it necessary to say that the first duty of a tribunal
which is called upon to interpret and apply the provisions of a treaty, is to
endeavor to give effect to them in their natural and ordinary meaning in
the context in which they occur. If the relevant words in their natural and
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ordinary meaning make sense in their context that is an end of the
matter.188
The application of the general rule of interpretation is not something theoretical, but it
has its practical effects. The way of how tribunals apply this rule, affect the outcomes
of the interpretation process and the rights and obligations of the treaty parties.

a.

In "a Good Faith":

Good faith as a requirement for treaty interpretation applies throughout the whole
process of interpretation. Good faith works as a general guideline to choose between
two or more competing meanings of the same treaty provision.189 It is a fundamental
rule in the application of a treaty. According to Article 26 of the VCLT, a treaty "must
be performed in a good faith"190. The application of any treaty requires its interpretation
as a necessity element for this application, so this interpretation must take place in a
good faith.

The principle of effective interpretation "Ut res magis valeat quam pereat" that requires
the preference of interpretation that gives a meaning to the term rather than none. This
principle is a separate customary international law, while, good faith is a principle that
combined with other interpretation means according to VCLT.191 According to the ILC
" when a treaty is open to two interpretations one of which does and the other does not
enable the treaty to have appropriate effects, good faith and the objects and purposes
of the treaty demand that the former interpretation should be adopted"192.

It is difficult determine a concrete content of the concept "good faith". However, this
concept appears to be a reasonable requirement whether to interpretation or the
application of a treaty.193 This concept is the final stage of the general means of
interpretation. Since the ordinary meaning has been established in accordance with
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context of the treaty and its object and purpose, this interpretation must result in a
reasonable interpretation.194 In case the ordinary meaning of the words led to
unreasonable results, another reasonable interpretation must be adopted under the
concept of "good faith". However, I argue that this reasonableness should be
determined in the light of the intent of the parties and their mutual consent as it appears
from the texts. This means that the meaning of treaty texts that reflects the intent of the
treaty parties should be the corner stone of the determination of this reasonableness.
Adjudicators ought to discover the meaning of the treaty terms not to create this
meaning.

The decisions and awards of arbitral tribunals usually do not refer to the good faith
principle. Adjudicators, by the other means of interpretation, may find an interpretation
that complies with this principle and they adopt this interpretation without mentioning
the good faith principle. On the contrary, adjudicators cannot depend only on the
principle "good faith" without other interpretation means. This would be an incorrect
application of article 31 of the VCLT. Then "this principle is misapplied and will be a
blanket authorization for subjective findings of legal issues"195. It is not a standalone
mean of interpretation. "Good faith" must be used with other interpretive elements.

Some commentators see that a principle like good faith has played an important role in
unifying the interpretations of international tribunals with respect to cases concerning
corruption, fraud and misrepresentation in international investment. They assert that
this principle has led to consistent decisions from various tribunals on the similar facts
in international investment arbitration.196

Arbitral tribunals usually relied on the principle of good faith to prefer an interpretation
that give a meaning to the term rather than the interpretation the dose not. For example,
the APPL tribunal asserted that a clause must be interpreted to give meaning to the term
rather than none, it held that it is" a canon of interpretation in all systems of law"197.
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However, other tribunals have a methodological problem with the application of this
element of interpretation. Based on the generality of the term, tribunals used "good
faith" as a blanket authorization to provide side-oriented interpretation. For example,
the Maffezini tribunal without an examination to the context to limit the interpretation
of the word "treatment" it assumed that there are no applicable rules of interpretation
except "good faith" to enable the investor to access international arbitration. The
tribunal held that:

"Like all other provisions of the BIT and in the absence of other specified
applicable rules of interpretation, Article X must be interpreted in the
manner prescribed by Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties. It provides that a treaty is to be “interpreted in good faith……
interpretation of Article X (2) would deprive this provision of any
meaning, a result that would not be compatible with generally accepted
principles of treaty interpretation, particularly those of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties"198.
The previous examples are evidence that the inconsistence interpretations caused by
methodological problems. The proper use of the "good faith" as a tool is to discover
the real meaning of a term, but using this element to justify an interpretation that goes
beyond the ordinary meaning of a text, would lead to wrong interpretation.

b.

The Ordinary Meaning of Treaty Terms:

The ultimate aim of treaty interpretation is to determine the correct meaning of its
provisions. This correct meaning is a reflection of the intents of the parties and what
these parties want the treaty to express.199 That is why adjudicators shall give the
ordinary meaning to the treaty provisions. Unless, it has been established that the
parties had intended to provide a special meaning to a provision, adjudicators ought to
adopt the ordinary meaning of this provision.200
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Article 31 (1) of the VCLT asserts that the textual approach is the base of the treaty
interpretation process.201 Therefore, the ordinary meaning is the starting point of the
interpretation process. It is natural since the terms and words of a treaty provisions have
been written by the parties and reflect the clear intents of these parties. This is the only
means of interpretation that includes direct indications of the intents of the parties and
their treaty commitments. Consequently, there is no need to go beyond the ordinary
meaning inasmuch as it is clear and there is no evidence that the treaty parties had
intended a special meaning.

The starting point to determine the "natural", "ordinary", "usual" or "normal" meaning
of a treaty text is linguistic and grammatical. Dictionaries are a source of these
meanings and these dictionaries may include more than one meaning to the same term.
Adjudicators usually choose from these various definitions. Moreover, the tense of the
treaty provisions is relevant to the ordinary meaning.202

Sometimes dictionaries are not sufficient to determine the ordinary meanings of the
texts. When the treaty obligations are vague or a legal principle based, the interpretation
of these provisions can be a challenge. For example, the interpretation of "investment"
or "investor" in international investment arbitration cannot be determined based on a
dictionary. The definition of these terms can be found in domestic laws or international
treaties. Similarly, the interpretation of the fair and equitable treatment, and how a state
can breach the investors' legitimate expectations. Adjudicators have to determine the
content of these principles to decide whether any of them has been breached by the host
state or not. The ordinary meaning here is not sufficient to interpret any of these
principles. The interpretation in this case depends on both internal and external
elements.203
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Arbitral tribunals may rely on other means of interpretation to confirm the ordinary
meaning that they adopted. For example, the APPL tribunal relied on the spirit of the
treaty, the principle of effectiveness, precedents and the treaty object and purpose to
affirm the suitability of the ordinary meaning.204 Other tribunals may state the ordinary
meaning based on the literal reading of the text without any reference to the
interpretation process especially when the terms are not vague. 205

The ordinary meaning requires the interpretation of the texts in the light of the context
and the treaty object and purpose. Some commentators assert, "Object and purpose are
modifiers of the ordinary meaning of a term which is being interpreted, the sense that
the ordinary meaning is to be identified in their light"206. In addition, the context works
as an aid selection to the ordinary meaning and modifier of any inconsistent
interpretation.207 Similarly, other sees that the context and the treaty object and purpose
work as a big picture to check the suitability of the ordinary meaning.208 According to
this opinion, the ordinary meaning must fit in the context and the treaty object and
purpose, otherwise, it should be tailored to fit in.209 However, I argue that the employed
terms in the treaty are the main sources of the intents of the parties. There is no a direct
indication of the intents of the parties in the treaty "object and purpose". Treaty object
and purpose must come as a second step to affirm an ordinary meaning, not to change
or modify it.
Tribunals may rely on the prior tribunals’ interpretations of a particular standard of
protection when this standard is a term of art. The treaty parties use this term because
it has its known meaning in a specific field. It is reasonable that the parties predict the
usual meaning for this term.210 Precedents may help in determining the ordinary
meaning of a term of art. However, arbitral tribunals carefully analyze the decisions
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and the awards of each other to ground their own decisions, not to find the ordinary
meaning of a term.

Because of the generality of the investment treaty terms, some arbitral tribunals have
used the ordinary meaning in conflicting ways. Consequently, they judge differently in
same kind of disputes, which resulted in contradictory decisions. Some tribunals
depend on the textual reading to adopt the broad meaning of the term. This adoption
based on an assumption that the parties have not expressly provided any limitations to
the generality of this term. For example, arbitral tribunals used to apply MFN clauses
to the substantive provisions only, without the procedural provisions in BITs.211 In
Maffezini, based on the open worded MFN clause that allows its application to "all
matters", the tribunal applied it to dispute settlement provisions. The tribunal adopted
an implicit interpretation that excluded any restrictions on the meaning of the MFN
clause because the limitations were not expressly provided for in this clause. This
allowed the incorporation of procedural provisions from the host state’s third-party
treaty to the basic treaty to facilitate the access to international arbitration.212

On the contrary, the open worded MFN clauses that were examined in Plama, Salini,
Telenor, Berschader, and Wintershall, are broad enough to be applied to dispute
settlement provisions. However, the tribunals rejected this application according the
ordinary meaning that should not be based on an assumption.213

The determination of the ordinary meaning is a dilemma. The practice of arbitral
tribunals approve that the same treaty provision can provide two or more conflicting
ordinary meanings. For instance, with respect to the application of the MFN clause to
the procedural provisions in BITs, one of the ordinary meanings is based on an
assumption and the implicit consent of the pretties to the BIT.214 This assumption is
that the open worded clause should be applied on its generality, since the parties
implicitly have agreed upon the broad scope of the application. On the contrary, the
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other ordinary meaning is based on the explicit consent of the parties not on an
assumption.215 Arbitral tribunals who adopted this ordinary meaning refused the
application of this clause to the procedural matters in BITs because the two parties had
not explicitly provided their consent to this broad scope of application.

Moreover, the MFN clause is a term of art in international investment law and has its
ancient interpretation before the Maffezini case. The treaty parties have used this clause
because of its well-known interpretation and content, not to redefine its scope of
application according to the foreign investors' desires. The determination of treaty
obligations should be based on explicit evidence not assumptions. Adjudicators cannot
use the silence of a clause to interpret it in a manner that modifies or expands the scope
of its application and broadens the jurisdiction of arbitral tribunals.

I believe that the natural and ordinary meaning of the texts is the basis of interpretation.
However, the ordinary meaning of a treaty provision should not be determined in the
abstract, but in the context of the terms and in the light of the object and purpose of the
treaty.

c.

The Context:

Article 31 (1) does not allow the determination of the ordinary meaning independently
of the whole treaty. The treaty terms have to be interpreted in the context of the whole
treaty, so adjudicators have to look at the treaty as a whole. All the elements of the
context specified in this Article are connected directly or indirectly to the treaty. These
elements are:216

- The treaty text, including its preamble and annexes
- Any agreement relating to the treaty which was made between all the parties in
connection with the conclusion of the treaty;
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- Any instrument, which was made by one or more parties in connection with the
conclusion of the treaty and accepted by the other parties as an instrument related to
the treaty.

With respect to international investment arbitration, arbitral tribunals rely on the text,
preamble and annex to identify and understand the context of the treaty provisions.
These tribunals rarely rely on the other two means, related agreements and instruments,
because of the unavailability of these means.217

The Permanent Court of International Justice asserted that treaty words obtain their
meaning from the context of their use, and the context is of the same importance of the
linguistic meaning in determining the correct meaning of the treaty terms.218 The entire
terms of the treaty have to be taken into account as a context this includes the preamble
and annexes.219 Even the title of a treaty has to be taken into account as a context.220

This requires also a comparison between the meaning of a term, a phrase or a provision
and same use of it in elsewhere in the treaty. The understanding of the consequences
of the same treaty terms illuminates the ordinary meaning of these terms.221 The
analogues wording of a relevant treaty assists in determining the textual interpretation
of the terms of the treaty.222

The preamble of the international investment treaty may explicitly state the aim and
purpose of this treaty, which illuminates the context of the whole treaty. The preamble
of the BITs always reflects the mutual agreement of the treaty parties to promote trade
and protect investments that are made by the nationals of one contracting party in the
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territory of the other contracting party.223 The treaty provisions, preamble and annexes
consist the context of the any BIT. The context reflects the textual approach of
interpretation. It serves as a mean to confirm the intended meaning or to help in the
selection of one of the competing ordinary meanings.

d.

The Object and Purpose of the Treaty:

According to Article 31 (1), "a treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance
with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty... in the light of its
object and purpose"224. The VCLT did not define neither the content of the treaty object
and purpose nor its elements. The treaty object and purpose require discussing not only
the method of ascertaining them but also the priority that should be given to them in
the process of treaty interpretation.

The provisions of some BITs explicitly indicate treaty object and purpose. However,
many of these BITs lack a clear "object and purpose", which make it difficult to
determine this interpretive element.225 Other BITs have no single object and purpose,
but many different or may be conflicting "objects and purposes".226

The treaty object and purpose are not an independent mean of interpretation, there is
an inextricable relation between it and the ordinary meaning.227 This mean reflects the
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teleological approach of interpretation that ascertain the general object and purpose of
the treaty. The process of interpretation requires a link between the purpose of the treaty
and its text. Therefore, if the texts of the treaty constitute a single object that aims to
achieve a specific purpose, the interpretation of these texts has to be harmonized with
the object and purpose of this treaty. This relationship between the ordinary meaning
and the treaty object and purpose would prevent treaty interpretations that are
incompatible with the correct meaning of the texts. Where the contractual and
consensual elements are clear according to the text of the treaty, the treaty object and
purpose are considered a crucial element in the treaty interpretation. However, this
comforting picture of international treaties does not exist in international investment
law. Usually contractual and consensual elements are not clear in BITs and both host
states and foreign investors invoke contradictory objects and purposes.

The treaties' subject and purpose can be expressed in the text, such as Article 1 of the
Charter of the Untied Nation.228 In addition, the kinds of some treaties may be helpful
in determining the object and purpose. For example, the object and purpose of the
boundary treaties is "stable and final boundaries".229

The preamble of a treaty regularly includes the treaty purpose as stated by the parties.
For example, the ICJ in the Rights of Nationals of the United States of America in
Morocco case affirmed that:" the purposes and objects of this Convention were stated
in its preamble"230.

In international investment arbitration, some tribunals rely on the title or the preamble
to determine the treaty object and purpose, which is always, promote and protect
foreign investments.231 This has become a usual assumption for the investment treaties.
The problem here is that some of these preambles are very carefully negotiated, and
others just copied and pasted.232 Moreover, the title or the preamble is not the
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appropriate place for stating treaty obligations, unlike the treaty provisions or
annexes.233

The tribunal in SGS v. Pakistan, for example, asserted that a treaty interpreter must
give effect to the subject and object that projected by the treaty as whole. The tribunal
ascertained the object and purpose, in the first instance, from the text of the BIT. 234 In
the same vein, the tribunal in Philippe Gruslin v. Malaysia, analyzed both the preamble
and the substantive articles of the treaty to determine the object and purpose of the
treaty.235

Some tribunals simply interpret the provisions of a treaty based on its purpose and
subject, without any references or indications to how the tribunal reached this purpose
and subject. For example, in the Sedelmayer (Franz) v. Russian Federation, the tribunal
concluded that the aim of the treaty is to promote the investments, as so far as possible,
in the two parties. Based on this conclusion, the tribunal justified the granting
protection to investment that corresponds to the previous purpose.236 Similarly, in Saba
Fakes v. Republic of Turkey, the tribunal stated the phrase "the object and purpose of
investment protection treaties" in general, without any further elaboration. Based on
this ungrounded treaty purpose, the tribunal avoided the application of a BIT provision
that requires the compliance of investments with the host state's domestic laws to be
considered investments under the BIT. The illegality of investments, according to the
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tribunal, denies the substantive protection of the BIT and the run counter to the previous
purpose.237

The subject and purpose in BITs is connected with the interests of the parties. In
multilateral treaties the "subject and purpose" does not related to a specific interest of
the parties. Therefore, this mean of interpretation may become less important in
interpreting the multilateral treaties with the non-existence of a specific "object and
purpose" of the parties.

With respect to the priority that should be given to the treaty object and purpose in
treaty interpretation, they serve to affirm the ordinary meaning or the intentions of the
treaty parties. Therefore, the treaty "object and purpose" is not a stand-alone mean of
interpretation. It serves to confirm the ordinary meaning of the texts that reflects the
intentions of the treaty parties. Moreover, the objects and purposes do not contain direct
obligations. Investment treaties are characterized by the generality and ambiguity of
their language, so treaty "object and purpose" should be elaborated comprehensively
in the decisions of the arbitral tribunals. The merely mention of the object and purpose
of a treaty to prefer a meaning to another would lead to wrong outcomes.
•

The Multiple Purposes of a Treaty:

With the generality and ambiguity of the treaty provisions and the lack of consensual
elements, adjudicators may find more than one purpose to the same treaty. Moreover,
with the detailed treaty provisions some tribunals examine only the purpose of the
provision that govern the dispute in question.

In ADF Group, Inc. v. US, the arbitral tribunal affirmed the NFTA's objectives in
Article 201(1) and its preamble are on a high level of generality that not suitable with
the dispute in question. The tribunal found that the particular detailed provision in its
particular place of the treaty functions as lex specialis, such as national treatment, mostfavored nation treatment and transparency. The tribunal held that "the object and
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purpose of the parties to a treaty in agreeing upon any particular paragraph of that treaty
are to be found, in the first instance, in the words in fact used by the parties in that
paragraph".238

The previous opinion raises many concerns. Adjudicators will find uncountable
purposes related to the same treaty. The whole purpose of the treaty is connected to
specific interests of the parties, what if the new purposes affect some of these interests.
The purposes of the same provision can vary from a treaty party to another. For
example, the MFN clause aims to protect the treaty rights of the foreign investor. This
investor may consider the purpose of this clause is to protect his right by facilitating
access to the international arbitration. On the contrary, the host states believe that the
MFN clause aims to prevent discrimination in relation to the substantive treatment and
access to international arbitration is against their interest. Since they may be held
responsible and being sanctioned. How could we balance between these contradictory
purposes?

Another opinion calls for the balancing between the competing purposes of the same
treaty.239 In interpreting investment treaties, according to this opinion, tribunals have
to figure out the consequences of the excessive protection of the foreign investors.240
This excessive protection, affect badly the promotion of the investments in host states.

In Eureko B.V. v. Republic of Poland, a dissenting opinion shouts to balance between
the competing purposes of the treaty. This opinion calls the tribunal to consider the
effects of the investors' excessive protection and its impact on the promotion of
investments. The opinion asserted that opining a wide door before investors to switch
their disputes from the normal jurisdiction of the commercial arbitration or domestic
courts to international investment arbitration would hamper the promotion of
investments. This opinion added that the arbitral tribunals created dangerous
precedents that provide privileges to the foreign investors. 241
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However, the general rule of interpretation refers to a single overarching purpose as a
telos to the whole treaty.242 In the case of the multi- purposes treaties, adjudicators have
to take into account the various purposes to reach one single purpose of the treaty to
best confirm the ordinary meaning, regardless the consequences of the adopted
interpretation. In other words, the consequences of interpretation are not an element of
the interpretation process. International arbitral tribunals must pay great attention to the
consent of the contracting states and the explicit meaning of the terms of the treaty.
This would demonstrate a proper administration of international justice with respect to
interpretation of the treaties. Adjudicators have to be mindful of Sir Ian Sinclair's words
of the "risk that the placing of undue emphasis on the ‘object and purpose’ of a treaty
will encourage teleological methods of interpretation which, in some of its more
extreme forms, will even deny the relevance of the intentions of the parties"243.

I believe that the treaty object and purpose, as a guidance for interpretation does not
mean to consider other affected interests. According to Art 31 (1) of the VCLT, any
ambiguity in the language should be interpreted “in good faith in accordance with the
ordinary meaning to be given to the terms ... in the light of its object and purpose". We
cannot divided the object and purpose of a treaty into many objects purposes according
to the provisions of the treaty. We must read the treaty in a manner that gives effect to
the object and purpose of the whole BIT. Article 31 of the VCLT speaks of one singular
"object and purpose". It is unacceptable to say that the singular "object and purpose" is
related to a single provision. This contradicts Article 31 of the VCLT that speaks of the
entire treaty as relevant to interpretation not its individual provisions.

e.

Subsequent Agreement and Subsequent Practice:

Subsequent agreement and subsequent practice, with other elements According to
Articles 31(3) of the VCLT, constitute the context for the purpose of treaty
interpretation. Subsequent agreements should be at the same rank of the interpreted
treaty. Since, "the external means of interpretation must be of equal rank of the object
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of interpretation"244. The subsequent practice of the parties related to the
implementation of a treaty is an objective evidence of the mutual understanding of this
treaty.245 This subsequent practice should be an element of interpretation insofar it
consists a sufficient, consistent and notable pattern of a state behavior related to the
treaty in question.

Both agreements should be between the treaty parties and "regarding to the
interpretation of the treaty or the application of its provisions"246. Some arbitral
tribunals examine the practices of the parties that occurred during the ratification
process of the BIT.247 However, this is not considered a practice for the purpose of
interpretation that requires the practice to be subsequent and related to the interpretation
or the application of the treaty provisions.

Many arbitral tribunals depend on the practice of the treaty parties to interpret BITs
without any elaboration to the status of this practice according to the VCLT. In National
Grid PLC v. Argentine Republic, the tribunal examined the Argentine and Panamanian
exchanged diplomatic notes with an “interpretative declaration” to determine whether
the MFN clause should be applied to dispute settlement provisions or not.248 The
tribunal asserted, "The review of the treaty practice of the State parties to the Treaty
with regard to their common intent is inconclusive"249. The practice lacks the
qualifications of subsequent practice under the VCLT. It is not about the application of
the BIT in the question. It did not establish any agreement between the parties regarding
to the interpretation. In general, this practice does not reflect any understanding of the
parties to the provisions of the BIT. Moreover, states negotiate and draft investment
treaties as separated deals between two parties; they are governed by the principle pacta
sunt servanda. When tribunals examine the practice of a state related to other BIT, they
apply subsidiary means related other treaties.250
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Article 31 (2) and (3) requires qualifications for these agreements and practices to be
relevant. First, an agreement that signed by all of the treaty parties and related to the
BIT in question. Second, any instrument related to the treaty, concluded by one of the
parties, and accepted by the others. Third, subsequent agreements or practices between
the parties related to the treaty. Adjudicators who rely on the previous materials, they
rely on clear interpretive materials according to the VCLT.

I believe that each BIT stands alone as a separated agreement between the two states
without any contemporary or subsequent agreements. Therefore, any BIT between one
of the parties and a third state is not relevant, since the BIT in question is the BIT that
should be interpreted not the host state’s third-party BIT. Similarly, the practices should
be between the parties to BIT, otherwise it would fall under Article 32 of the VCLT
that may be taken into account as a common intent of the parties. Subsequent
agreements and practices as elements of interpretation are well established in the
practice of international courts and they are important elements of interpretation
especially in the early international jurisprudence.251 However, in international
investment treaties, states rarely have subsequent practices or subsequent agreements
under the concept that is stated in Article 31 (3) of the VCLT.252

f.

Any Relevant Rules of International Law Applicable in the Relation

between the Parties:

The relevant rules of international law are another element that has to be taken into
account with the context to interpret the treaty provisions. This mean refers to the
international legal system as a whole as part of the context of every treaty subjects to
international law.253 By this mean, the VCLT created the foundation of a systematic
approach to the interpretation of international treaties and whatever their subject matter,
treaties are a creation of the international law and their operation is predicated upon
that fact.254
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Under this mean, the relevant rules can be existed in all the primary sources of
international law.255 According to Article 38 (1) of the ICJ, these primary sources are
conventions, international customary rules and the general principles of law recognized
by civilized nations.256

This interpretational mean refers to the international legal system as a single system.
Moreover, it mitigates the effects of what the ILC called the fragmentation of
international law, and promotes its systemic integration.257 Based on this mean, treaty
interpretation transgresses all specialized sub-regions of international law, such as
international investment law, environmental law, trade law, international criminal law,
law of the sea and human rights law.258

The ILC's Study Group depended of the decision of the ICJ in oil platform case to shed
the light on the role of Article 13 (3) (c) in treaty interpretation. The court invoked
Article 13 (3) (c) to interpret the treaty provisions and asserted that the treaty in
question cannot work independently from the rules of international law on the use of
force, even to limit the context. The court continued, "The application of the relevant
rules of international law relating to this question thus forms an integral part of the task
of interpretation entrusted to the Court".259

Only the rules of international law that are applicable in the relations between the
parties, can be used for the purpose of interpretation. In Maffezini v. Spain, 260 the
tribunal examined the provisions of the ICSID convention to determine whether the
basic BIT requires the exhaustion of local remedies before access to international
arbitration or not. The tribunal asserted that the relevant articles of the ICSID
convention reverse the traditional international rules. The tribunal interpreted the BIT
provisions to determine whether Spain has conditioned its acceptance to the tribunal's
jurisdiction on the exhaustion of local remedies or not.
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Some tribunals relied on the general rules of international law to interpret the treaty
provisions and determine the obligations of the parties. For example, in Noble
Ventures, Inc. v. Romania, the tribunal relied on one of the general rules to interpret
the Umbrella clause. The Tribunal asserted, "The well-established rule in general
international law that in normal circumstances per se a breach of a contract by the State
does not give rise to direct international responsibility on the part of the State."261

Some tribunals relied on customary international law as relevant rules to interpret treaty
provisions. For example, in Phoenix Action, Ltd. v. Czech Republic,

262

the tribunal

depended on the principle of good faith as a general principle of customary
international law, not as a mean of interpretation, to interpret the term "investment".
The tribunal found that the investments that are protected internationally under the BIT
are only those are made in compliance with the principle of good faith and do not
attempt to misuse the domestic legal system. Similarly, the NAFTA Free Trade
Commission asserted that customary international rules are relevant in the
interpretation of the NAFTA's standards.263

Some tribunals misapply the "relevant rules of international law" in the treaty
interpretation. They skip the logical sequences of the steps of the treaty interpretation
process, which requires a search for the ordinary meaning in the light of the context,
object and purpose of the treaty.264 For example, the tribunal in Alex Genin and others
v. Estonia, skipped all the means of interpretation and immediately equated between
the treaty terms and international customary rules, to interpret a provision that grant
investors fair and equitable treatment.265
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The role of "the relevant rules of international law" is to affirm or clarify the ordinary
meaning of the treaty terms. Where there are applicable rules between the parties such
as conventions, international customary rules and the general principles of international
law, adjudicators must examine these rules to determine the correct interpretation.
Searching the various binding rules and commitments of the parties is helpful for the
reasonableness of the interpretation of the BITs. The rules of public international law
that have been developed over centuries will be an effective guidance to the
interpretations of these BITs.

g.

A Special Meaning Instead of Ordinary Meaning:

A special meaning may adopted to a particular treaty term when anything relevant to
the treaty and its parties indicates that they had intended to provide this special meaning
to this term. Both the ordinary and special meaning might be titled as methods that
indicate to the adjudicators how to deal with the interactions between evidence.266
Article 31 (4) of VCLT is an exception of the adoption of the ordinary meaning that
governed by Article 31 para1. This exception deals with the cases when the parties
replace the ordinary meaning, implicitly or explicitly, by a special one.267

Article 31 (4) includes two cases according to which adjudicators have to adopt the
special meaning. The First, when the text and the context of a treaty have technical
meaning because of a specific field that is covered by this treaty.268 In this case, it seems
that the interpreters try to give the treaty provisions their ordinary meaning in the light
of the field that is covered by this treaty. The second, when the treaty parties intended
to give the term a special meaning instead of its ordinary meaning.269 This special
meaning, as a method of interpretation, looks for the intentions of the parties, rather

The tribunal held that "while the exact content of this standard is not clear, the Tribunal under stands it
to require an “international minimum standard” that is separate from domestic law, but that is, indeed, a
minimum standard. Acts that would violate this minimum standard would include acts showing a wilful
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than what is the text expresses. It looks for a meaning that is different from the ordinary
meaning of the term. The burden of proof that the parties had intended to provide a
special meaning to a treaty term lies on the party who invokes the existence of this
special meaning and the mutual intents towards this meaning. The permanent Court of
International Justice affirmed this point in the Eastern Greenland case when it held that:

[T]he geographical meaning of the word "Greenland", i.e. the name which
is habitually used in the maps to denominate the whole island, must be
regarded as the ordinary meaning of the word. If it is alleged by one of the
Parties that some unusual or exceptional meaning is to be attributed to it,
it lies on that Party to establish its contention.270
Article 31 (4) of the VCLT expressly asserts that the special meaning prevails over the
ordinary meaning, if it is established that the parties so intended. This proves the
fundamental role of the parties' intents in treaty interpretation. This article implicitly
asserted that the ordinary meaning of the text has the priority in treaty interpretation,
since the ordinary meaning is the reflection of the intents of the parties, and these
parties can adopt another meaning instead of this ordinary meaning. Therefore, the
interpretation of the treaty terms should be consistent with the intent of the parties as it
appears from the treaty provision.

2.

The Supplementary Means of Interpretation According to Article 32 of

the VCLT:

Article 31 of the VCLT uses exhaustive means of interpretation as "a general rule" of
interpretation. On the contrary, Article 32 of the VCLT uses what might be called nonexhaustive method of enumeration under the name of supplementary means of
interpretation. This leaves a discretionary power to adjudicators to use "beside the
preparatory work and the circumstance of the conclusion of a treaty, also other
evidences and methods"271. The using of the word "including" in Article 32 indicates
that the preparatory work and the circumstance are examples, and supplementary
means, in this Article, is not an exclusive list.
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Consequently, the purpose of applying these means is: (1) to confirm the meaning that
resulting from the application the general rule of interpretation under Article 31 of the
VCLT, or (2) when the application of this general rule leaves the meaning ambiguous
or obscure, or resulted in manifestly absurd or unreasonable meaning.272 Under Article
32 of the VCLT, adjudicators can apply the supplementary means, but they are not
obliged to apply these means when the application of general rule resulted in a clear
meaning.273

a.

The Preparatory Work of a Treaty:

There is no a recognized definition of the preparatory work (travaux preparatoires) in
international law.274 Moreover, there are no rules according to which the adjudicators
can determine the kind of materials that are qualified as a preparatory work, neither
how far back in the history of a treaty can the adjudicators go to look for a preparatory
work.275 Arbitral tribunals use preparatory work as a resource of clarification
information that affirms a meaning that has been accepted, at least implicitly, by the
treaty parties.276 These tribunals depend on anything that helps to determine the
meaning of a treaty provision, since the purpose of the preparatory work, as a mean of
interpretation, is to discover what is the parties had intended to in their treaty.277

The materials that can be a preparatory work must be able to be objectively to assist
adjudicators. These materials must be part of the outside world of the treaty.

278

This

includes all documents relevant to the treaty from its preparation to its conclusion.279
For example, memoranda, drafts, commentaries, other statements and observations
transmitted by states to each other.280
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b.

The Circumstances of the Conclusion of a Treaty:

According to Article 32, the circumstance of the conclusion of a treaty, along with
preparatory work, is supplementary means of interpretation.281 This Article allows
adjudicators to take into account the circumstance of the conclusion of a treaty in
interpreting its provisions. This includes the contemporary circumstances and the
historical context of the conclusion of the treaty.282 The factual circumstances present
at the time of the treaty conclusion and the historical background of the treaty, reflect
what was presented in the minds of the treaty parties at the time of the treaty
conclusion.283

The WTO Appellate Body in several occasions referred to the circumstances of the
conclusion of a treaty according the meaning in Article 32 of the VCLT. The Appellate
Body asserted that:

[I]n the light of our observations on "the circumstances of the conclusion"
of a treaty as a supplementary means of interpretation under Article 32 of
the Vienna Convention. We consider that the classification practice in the
European Communities during the Uruguay Round is part of "the
circumstances of the conclusion" of the WTO Agreement and may be used
as a supplementary means of interpretation within the meaning of Article
32 of the Vienna Convention.284
The adjudicators have to be aware of the events, facts and circumstances of the
conclusion or drafting history of the treaty. It is not acceptable to separate between the
provisions of the treaty and these circumstances nor to neglect the relationship between
these provisions and the external conditions of the treaty parties.

The value of the circumstances of the conclusion of a treaty, and its formation, as a
supplementary mean of interpretation should be subjected to certain qualifications. The
VCLT did not designate these qualifications. Consequently, adjudicators, in
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international investment arbitration, are the higher power that determines what should
be considered as circumstances of a conclusion of the treaty and the value of these
circumstances as a supplementary mean of interpretation. Adjudicators determine this
on case-by-case bases.

3.

The Interpretation of the Silence of a Treaty Term:

Adjudicators may find a treaty provision that is vague, ambiguous or silent to the extent
that it does not give a determinate answer to the question of whether its application
covers a particular issue or not. The interpretation of this provision can give conflict
answers to the question of whether the parties to a treaty had included or excluded that
issue from the scope of the provision's application. How should we interpret this
provision? For example, if the parties to a treaty intended to apply a provision to a
specific issue, should this provision explicitly defines this issue as a subject matter of
its application. In this case, this treaty provision will not be applied to any issues except
these that are defined by the provision, regardless the broad wording of this clause or
its generality. Alternatively, if the parties to a treaty intended to exclude an issue from
the scope of the application of a treaty provision, should this provision explicitly
excludes this issue from the scope of its application. In this case, the treaty provision
will be applied to all the issues that are subjected to the treaty except these issues that
the provision has explicitly excluded from the scope of its application.

This problem raises the question of who should bear the risk of the silence of the treaty
provision. Should this silence be interpreted in favor of the host state or in favor of the
foreign investors? There are two conflicting answers to this question.

First, the doubt or ambiguity in treaty provisions should be interpreted in favor of the
host state rather than foreign investors. This opinion assumes that governments are held
with the standards of transparency and responsibility in their relations with the foreign
investors.285 In contrast, the other opinion considers that the broad wording of the treaty
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provision is a presumption in favor of the protection of the foreign investors. According
to this opinion, adjudicators should interpret the jurisdictional provisions or the
standards of states liability in favor of the foreign investors. Since this would elevate
the systematic protection of foreign investors. This opinion equals between the
investors' interests and human rights within any state with respect to the priority
governmental decision-making.286 Others call for limitations to the protection of the
foreign investors based on the principle of minimum limitation of the state sovereignty.
According to this opinion, this minimum limitation should be the starting point of the
interpretation of any ambiguous provision and this is the ordinary meaning that the
generality of any treaty cannot override it.287

The application of MFN clauses to dispute settlement provisions raises the same
debate. With the broad wording of the MFN clause that includes phrases like "all
matters or MFN treatment", some arbitral tribunals applied this clause to dispute
settlement provisions in BITs and others refused this application.288

I believe that the problem is not about who should bear the risk of the silence of the
treaty provision; it is about the correct interpretation of the provision. Adjudicators
must not interpret the treaty provisions by presumptions in their minds. They have to
examine all the means of interpretation to find the real and correct meaning of the treaty
provisions. The interpretation of a treaty is to determine the treaty rights and obligations
of the parties, not the renegotiation of this treaty. Adjudicators should follow the logic
sequence of the application of the rules of interpretation to find the correct meaning of
the terms of the treaty.
government is held to high standards of transparency and responsibility for the clarity and consistency
in its interaction with foreign investors.
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4.

The Hierarchical Order among the Means of Interpretation in the

VCLT:

The hierarchical preference of the means of interpretation is another dilemma in the
treaty interpretation. The issue of the determinate significance of the various means of
interpretation has not been settled, at least, in a satisfactory way whether before or after
the codification of the VCLT, which resulted in a significant amount of debate.
Different approaches to interpretation of treaties have been embedded in Articles 31
and 32 of the VCLT. These articles contain ways of weighing and choosing the
evidence of interpretation. The evidence of the intentions of the parties can be found in
the text of a treaty, preparatory work, preamble and annexes. The evidence of
understanding can be found in subsequent agreements after the conclusion of a treaty
and the subsequent practices of a treaty. Moreover, there are elements that may affect
the understanding of the texts such as the circumstances of a treaty conclusion, the
applicable rules of international law and treaty object and purpose. The application of
these rules may result in competing interpretations.

Adjudicators usually face contradictory evidence through the application of the
interpretation rules. The concluded interpretation for the same text may vary from the
application of one rule to another and the nature of the treaty itself would vary.
Depending on the text of a treaty, as a source of the intents of the parties, would
guarantee the stability to the treaty rights and obligations, whereas, depending on
teleological tools of interpretation would develop these rights and obligations.

The application of each rule of the rules of interpretation separately would resulted in
conflicting interpretations to the same text. This is what happened with the ICJ in
deferent stages of proceedings; it gave different interpretations to the same provision.289
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Moreover, the ICSID tribunals interpreted the same provision differently in two cases
that were included similar facts.290

The ILC, during the codification of the means of interpretation in 1964-1966, was very
careful not to prejudice the hierarchy among the means of interpretation. In its 1966
commentary, the ILC explicitly asserted that the order of the Articles 31 and 32 does
not mean a hierarchical order to the application of these means. The commission
asserted, "The application of the means of interpretation in the article would be a single
combined operation"291 and "all the various elements, as they were present in any given
case, would be thrown into the crucible, and their interaction would give the legally
relevant interpretation."292 The ILC added that the division line between the primary
means and the supplementary means is not a strict line, and the function of both kinds
of means is to "establish a general link between the two articles and maintains the unity
of the process of interpretation"293.

Some argue that the sequence of these rules in Articles 31 and 32 of the VCLT consists
a hierarchical order that has to be followed.294 According to this opinion, tools like
ordinary meaning, text, context and purposes are not applied together at the same time.
For example, they see that the role of treaty object and purpose is less than searching
for the meaning, the role of treaty object and purpose is to confirm this meaning. They
see that the VCLT gave the priority to the textual approach.295

Others see that all the interpretational means should be considered as unity and
complete each other. This opinion sees that the order of Article 31 and 32 as a list does
not provides a hierarchical sequence. They affirm that the general rule of interpretation
does not include a chronological or hierarchical order among the rules of interpretation.
This allows the interpretive process to take place by using any or all of these
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interpretive rules simultaneously.296 In the same vein, the tribunal in Millicom
International Operations BV and Sentel GSM SA v. Senegal, sees that there is no
hierarchical order between Article 31 and 32 of the VCLT and all the means of
interpretation "combine with each other and complete each other"297.

This unresolved question has led to inconsistent interpretations to many provisions in
BITs. It leaves adjudicators with a great discretionary power to the extent that the
parties to a treaty cannot predict the interpretation of their treaty provisions.
Adjudicators determine the applicable rule of interpretation and this rule can vary from
a tribunal to another. Then interpretation will not be about the meaning of the text, but
about which rule of the rules of interpretation will be applied. This discretionary power
is the main reason for a sharp criticism. H. Lauterpacht asserted that:
… as a rule they (rules of interpretation) are not the determining cause of
judicial decision, but the form in which the judge cloaks a result arrived at
by other means… it is a fallacy to assume that the existence of these rules
is a secure safeguard against arbitrariness or partiality."298
Lauterpacht adds that, we should not focus on the criticism of the rules of interpretation
or their numbers, but we have to focus on the manner of the application of these rules,
the accuracy of a certain rule and the hierarchal order among these rules when all of
them should be applied.299

Similarly, another opinion compares the rules of interpretation to playing cards. This
opinion asserts that the flexibility of the rules of interpretation in the VCLT allows to
all the approaches of interpretation to be applied, and these rules can be twisted and
bent and the priority can be given according to the preference of the interpreter. This
opinion sees that the adopted interpretation relies on which card of the VCLT cards
will be selected.300
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Thus, the interpretation rules in Articles 31 and 32 of the VCLT bind the treaty parties,
international courts and tribunals. The structure framework of these rules allows for
discretion and flexibility to these courts and tribunals in applying these rules.301

I argue that the application of the rules of interpretation in the VCLT is compulsory
and the full compliance with them will resolve the problems of inconsistent and
conflicting interpretations in investor-state arbitration. Neglecting the logical sequence
of these rules will create inconsistent interpretations and conflicting decisions in
disputes that are governed by the same treaty provisions that have the same wording.
The neglect and misapplication of the international rules on treaty interpretation will
lead to wrong interpretations.

I believe that the logical sequence of the concepts in Articles 31 of the VCLT reflects
the logical and natural progression of the process of interpretation of the treaty. This
progression should start with the ordinary meaning of the text, then the context, object
and purpose and then any external elements that reflect the intents of the parties. The
ordinary meaning that reflects the intents of the parties should prevails over other tools
of interpretation. The treaty object and purpose is a second step that affirms the ordinary
meaning. Adjudicators should not use the treaty object and purpose as a stand-alone
mean of interpretation. The great emphasis on the object and purpose will deny any
relevance of the intents of the parties to the interpretation of their treaty. In addition,
the supplementary means of interpretation are used only in two cases and for one
purpose. They are used to determine the meaning when the interpretation according to
Article 31 resulted in either ambiguous or unreasonable meaning. This means that
supplementary means are used to confirm the ordinary meaning resulting from Article
31 of the VCLT. Following the logical sequence of the rules of interpretation will led
to correct conclusions.

Many arbitral tribunals used the unresolved question of the hierarchical order among
the means of interpretation to grant excessive protection to the foreign investors.
Tribunals depend on the assumption that the purpose of any BIT is to protect the foreign
investors, and the international arbitration will guarantee this protection. These
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tribunals give the priority to many tools of interpretation except the text of the treaty,
to expand the application of the MFN clause beyond the ordinary meaning of its
wording. They give foreign investors the right to amend the treaty after its conclusion.
The contemporary case law in the next chapter will indicate this fact.

D.

Conclusion:

In this chapter, I have explored the nature of treaty interpretation, treaty Interpretation
according to the subjective and objective approaches of international law, the analysis
of Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties and the arbitral
use of these articles to interpret BITs.

In the first section, I have demonstrated how the world of any human or legal person
consists of normative universes. These universes structured around the possibility of
right or wrong, of lawful or unlawful, of valid or void, or permissible or impermissible.
International law is one of these normative universes and it has developed rules that
regulate treaty interpretation. These rules of interpretation validate or invalidate certain
practices or construct a certain reality. Treaty interpretation operates within this
normative universe and within the framework of pre-existing rules that have to be
followed. The rules of interpretation determine the way we go about interpretation - or
ought to go about it – and this is essential to what can be achieved by arbitral tribunals
and ad hoc committees. I have distinguished between two different conceptions of
interpretation. The first sees interpretation as a process of finding out what the treaty
texts mean or what the parties to a treaty want its texts to express. The second sees that
interpretation is more than meaning ascertainment. Interpretation, according to the
second conception, is a creative act that provides the interpreter with choices and the
rules of interpretation are the sources of these choices. I have analyzed the pure theory
of law to find out what exactly interpretation can be. According to Kelsen, we cannot
use interpretation to create new norms within the legal system or to provide meanings
that contradict the interpreted text. The function of interpretation is to discover the
meaning from the existing norms. Kelsen refuses to assign a special role to
interpretation in the case of legal gaps, since these gaps must not be filled by
interpretation. He considers these gabs as a negative norm and interpretation has
nothing to do with the non-existence of an obligation.
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I have answered the crucial question of whether treaty interpretation is a science or an
art. I have indicated the problems with opinion who says that interpretation is an art.
This means that achieving certainty in interpretation is a utopian dream. Moreover, the
outcomes of any interpretation process will be correct since the results are works of art.
In addition, there will be no any rules to determine whether the results of treaty
interpretation are correct or wrong. International courts and arbitral tribunals always
refer to the rules of interpretation of the Vienna Convention on the law of treaties and
this is a sufficient evidence that there is a tendency to highlight the science element in
treaty interpretation. The fact that many international courts and arbitral tribunals may
or may not correctly apply interpretation rules will not turns the nature of treaty
interpretation from a science to an art. However, interpretation is not an exact science,
it is still a science requiring the application of certain rules to produce correct results.
In addition, science and art are not mutually exclusive. Interpretation is a science, that
is, artful. Interpretation requires the application of a set of predetermined rules and the
correct application of these rules will result in correct outcomes. Conversely, the
neglect or the misapplication of these rules will result in wrong interpretations. This
means that the application of a science to some extent needs an art. This truth should
not refute the nature of treaty interpretation as a science that regulated by a certain
binding rules.

In section two, I have discussed the treaty interpretation from the perspectives of the
objective and subjective approaches. I have illustrated that each of them has his
different answer to the question of why treaties are binding. These conflicting answers
affected the visions of these two approaches in respect of treaty interpretation.
However, the subjective and objective approaches affirm the priority of the "ordinary"
meaning of treaty provisions, they do not agree on what the ordinary meaning is
especially when the treaty provision provides more than one ordinary meanings. This
conflict crystalized in the disagreement on the overriding force of the "ordinary
meaning". According to the subjective understanding, the original intent of the treaty
parties is the primary element of interpretation and overrides the "ordinary meaning" if
they conflict with each other. On the contrary, in the objective understanding, "ordinary
meaning" is a secondary element of interpretation. The objective understanding gives
the priority, in treaty interpretation, to the considerations of good faith, teleology,
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reciprocity or justice considerations. Indeed, both approaches have failed to provide a
comprehensive solution to treaty interpretation. To follow the subjective approach, we
have to exclude any objective elements of interpretation, in the same vein, to follow
the objective approach we have to exclude any subjective elements of interpretation. If
one of these approaches uses the elements of the other, both of them will be
indistinguishable. I concluded that both of them are necessary to determine the proper
interpretation of the provisions of BITs. Adjudicators cannot not constantly follow one
approach without the other. Adjudicators shift from a subjective approach to an
objective approach vice-versa and stop only in the point where they find that this
interpretation is the reflection of what the parties had consented to. Adjudicators do not
characterize their interpretation by anything except that this is what every state had
consented to.

In section three, I have explained the functional use of each mean of the means of
interpretation in Articles 31 and 32 in the VCLT and the arbitral use of these means. In
addition, I have discussed how should arbitral tribunals interpret the silence of treaty
provisions, and how should these tribunals follow the logical hierarchical order among
the means of interpretation.

I have argued that however, it is difficult to determine a concrete content to "good
faith", it applies throughout the whole interpretation process and it works as a general
guideline to choose between two or more competing meanings. This element can give
effect to interpretation that gives a meaning to a term rather than none. This element
also can give effect to interpretation that enables the treaty to have appropriate effects
rather than none. Arbitral tribunals usually do not refer to "good faith" as a mean of
interpretation. This element of interpretation helped in unifying interpretations in
respect of disputes concerning corruption, fraud and misrepresentation in international
investment arbitration. I have asserted that some tribunals used this element of
interpretation as a blanket authorization to provide one side-oriented interpretation,
investors oriented. This is not a stand-alone element of interpretation and the proper
use of "good faith" as a tool is to discover the real meaning of term, but using this
element to justify an interpretation that goes beyond the ordinary meaning of a text,
would lead to wrong interpretation.
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With respect to the ordinary meaning, I have argued that it is the starting point of the
interpretation process. The practice of the arbitral tribunals asserts that the same treaty
provision can provide two or more conflicting ordinary meanings. Usually these
tribunals turn to dictionaries to search for the linguistic meanings, but dictionaries are
not sufficient to determine the ordinary meanings of specific terms. Therefore, the
interpretation of terms like "investment", "investor" or "MFN clauses" in international
investment arbitration cannot be determined based on the dictionary definitions. The
MFN clause is a term of art in international investment law and has its ancient
interpretation before Maffezini case. The treaty parties have used this clause because of
its well-known obligations, not to redefine its scope of application. Adjudicators cannot
use the silence of a clause to interpret it in a manner that modifies or expands the scope
of its application and broadens the jurisdiction of arbitral tribunals. I concluded that the
ordinary meaning of a treaty provision should not be determined in the abstract, but in
the context of the terms and in the light of the object and purpose of the treaty.

With respect to the context, the treaty words obtain their meaning from the context of
their use, and the context is of the same importance of the linguistic meaning in
determining the correct meaning of the treaty terms. The entire terms of the treaty have
to be taken into account. In addition, a context includes the preamble and annexes. This
element requires also the comparison between a term, a phrase or a provision's
meanings and same use of it, in elsewhere in the treaty. The context reflects the textual
approach of interpretation. It serves as a mean to confirm the intended meaning or to
help in the selection of one of the competing ordinary meanings.

With respect to the treaty object and purpose, I have examined the framework of this
element in treaty interpretation. This element is not a stand-alone mean of
interpretation. There is an inextricable relation between it and the text. The objects and
purposes do not contain direct obligations, and both serves to affirm the ordinary
meaning or the intents of the treaty parties. I have argued that many arbitral tribunals
have relied on the object and purpose to justify their pro-investor interpretations.
Placing great emphasis on the "object and purpose" of a treaty will deny any relevance
of the intents of the treaty parties to interpretation and would lead to wrong outcomes.
This element serves to confirm the ordinary meaning of the texts that reflects the
intentions of the treaty parties. Investment treaties are characterized by the generality
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and ambiguity of their language, so treaty "object and purpose" should be elaborated
comprehensively in the decisions of the arbitral tribunals. The merely mention of the
object and purpose of a treaty to prefer a meaning to another would lead to wrong
outcomes.

With respect to the multiple purposes of a treaty, some treaties include provisions that
explicitly indicate the object and purpose, but most BITs have no single purpose. With
the generality and ambiguity of the treaty provisions and the lack of consensual
elements, adjudicators may find more than one purpose to the same treaty. Moreover,
with the detailed treaty provisions some tribunals examine only the purpose of the
provision that govern the dispute in question. I concluded that according to Art 31 (1)
of the VCLT, any ambiguity in the language should be interpreted “in good faith in
accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms ... in the light of its
object and purpose". We cannot divided the object and purpose of a treaty into many
objects purposes according to the provisions of the treaty. We must read the treaty in a
manner that gives effect to the object and purpose of the whole BIT. Article 31 of the
VCLT speaks of one singular "object and purpose". It is unacceptable to say that the
singular "object and purpose" is related to a single provision. This contradicts Article
31 of the VCLT that speaks of the entire treaty as relevant to interpretation not its
individual provisions.

With respect to the subsequent agreement and subsequent practice, Article 31 (2) and
(3) of the VCLT requires some qualifications for these agreements and practices to be
relevant. First, an agreement that signed by all of the treaty parties and related to the
BIT in question. Second, any instrument related to the treaty, concluded by one of the
parties, and accepted by the others. Third, subsequent agreements or practices between
the parties related to the treaty. Adjudicators who rely on the previous materials, they
rely on clear interpretive materials according to the VCLT. I have explained that each
BIT stands alone as a separated agreement between the two states without any
contemporary or subsequent agreements. Therefore, any BIT between one of the parties
and a third state is not relevant, for the purpose of interpretation under Article 31 of the
VCLT, since the BIT in question is the BIT that should be interpreted not the host
state’s third-party BIT. Similarly, the practices should be between the parties to BIT,
otherwise it would fall under Article 32 of the VCLT that may be taken into account as
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a common intent of the parties. Subsequent agreements and practices as elements of
interpretation are well established in the practice of international courts and they are
important elements of interpretation especially in the early international jurisprudence.
I concluded that in international investment treaties, states rarely have subsequent
practices or subsequent agreements under the concept that is stated in Article 31 (3) of
the VCLT.

With respect to the relevant rules of international law, these rules have to be taken into
account in interpreting treaty provisions. This mean refers to the international legal
system as a whole as part of the context of every treaty subjects to international law.
By this mean, the VCLT created the foundation of a systematic approach to the
interpretation of international treaties and whatever their subject matter, treaties are a
creation of the international law and their operation is predicated upon that fact. Under
this mean, the relevant rules can be existed in all the primary sources of international
law. According to Article 38 (1) of the ICJ, these primary sources are conventions,
international customary rules and the general principles of law recognized by civilized
nations. This interpretational mean refers to the international legal system as a single
system. Based on this mean, treaty interpretation transgresses all specialized subregions of international law, such as international investment law, environmental law,
trade law, international criminal law, law of the sea and human rights law. I concluded
that the role of "the relevant rules of international law" is to affirm or clarify the
ordinary meaning of the treaty terms. Where there are applicable rules between the
parties such as conventions, international customary rules and the general principles of
international law, adjudicators must examine these rules to determine the correct
interpretation. Searching the various binding rules and commitments of the parties is
helpful for the reasonableness of the interpretation of the BITs. The rules of public
international law that have been developed over centuries will be an effective guidance
to the interpretations of these BITs.

With respect to the special meaning, it may be adopted to a particular treaty term when
anything relevant to the treaty and its parties indicates that they had intended to provide
this special meaning to this term. Both the ordinary and special meaning might be titled
as methods that indicate to the adjudicators how to deal with the interactions between
evidence. Article 31 (4) of the VCLT includes two cases according to which
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adjudicators have to adopt the special meaning. The First, when the text and the context
of a treaty have technical meaning because of a specific field that is covered by this
treaty. In this case, it seems that the interpreters try to give the treaty provisions their
ordinary meaning in the light of the field that is covered by this treaty. The second,
when the treaty parties intended to give the term a special meaning instead of its
ordinary meaning. This special meaning, as a method of interpretation, looks for the
intentions of the parties, rather than what is the text expresses. I concluded that Article
31 (4) of the VCLT expressly asserts that a special meaning prevails over the ordinary
meaning, if it is established that the parties so intended. This proves the fundamental
role of the parties' intents in treaty interpretation. This article implicitly asserted that
the ordinary meaning of the text has the priority in treaty interpretation, since the
ordinary meaning is the reflection of the intents of the parties, and these parties can
adopt another meaning instead of this ordinary meaning. Therefore, the interpretation
of the treaty terms should be consistent with the intent of the parties as it appears form
the treaty provisions.

In addition, I have explored the supplementary means of interpretation; the preparatory
work of a treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion according to the VCLT. the
purpose of applying these supplementary means is: (1) to confirm the meaning that
resulting from the application the general rule of interpretation under Article 31 of the
VCLT, or (2) when the application of this general rule leaves the meaning ambiguous
or obscure, or resulted in manifestly absurd or unreasonable meaning. Under Article
32 of the VCLT, adjudicators can apply the supplementary means, but they are not
obliged to apply these means when the application of general rule resulted in a clear
meaning.

With respect to the preparatory work a treaty, there are no rules according to which the
adjudicators can determine the kind of materials that are qualified as a preparatory
work, neither how far back in the history of a treaty can go the adjudicators look for a
preparatory work. However, the materials that can be a preparatory work must be able
to be objectively to assist adjudicators. These materials must be part of the outside
world of the treaty. This includes all documents relevant to the treaty from its
preparation to its conclusion. For example, memoranda, drafts, commentaries, other
statements and observations transmitted by states to each other. With respect to the
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circumstance of the conclusion of a treaty, it reflects what was presented in the minds
of the treaty parties at the time of the treaty conclusion. Adjudicators, in international
investment arbitration, are the higher power that determines what should be considered
as circumstances of a conclusion of the treaty and the value of these circumstances as
a supplementary mean of interpretation. Adjudicators determine this on case-by-case
bases.

Then I have demonstrated how different tribunals interpret the silence of the treaty
provisions. This problem raises the question of who should bear the risk of the silence
of the treaty provision. The first opinion sees that this silence be interpreted in favor of
the host state. The second opinion considers that the broad wording of the treaty
provisions is a presumption in favor of the protection of the foreign investors. I have
concluded that the problem is not about who should bear the risk of the silence of the
treaty provision; it is about the correct interpretation of the provision. Adjudicators
must not interpret the treaty provisions by presumptions in their minds. They have to
examine all the means of interpretation to find the real and correct meaning of the treaty
provisions. The interpretation of a treaty is to determine the treaty rights and obligations
of the parties, not the renegotiation of this treaty. Adjudicators should follow the logic
sequence of the application of the rules of interpretation to find the correct meaning of
the terms of the treaty.

With respect to the hierarchical order among the means of interpretation in the VCLT,
this issue has not been settled, at least, in a satisfactory way whether before or after the
codification of the VCLT. I have argued that the application of the rules of
interpretation is compulsory and the full compliance with them will resolve the
problems of inconsistent and conflicting interpretations in investor-state arbitration.
Neglecting the logical sequence of these rules will create inconsistent interpretations
and conflicting decisions in disputes that are governed by the same treaty provisions
that have the same wording. The neglect and misapplication of the international rules
on treaty interpretation will lead to wrong interpretations.

I concluded that the logical sequence of the concepts in Articles 31 of the VCLT reflects
the logical and natural progression of the process of interpretation of the treaty. This
progression should start with the ordinary meaning of the text, then the context, object
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and purpose and then any external elements that reflect the intents of the parties. The
ordinary meaning that reflects the intents of the parties should prevails over other tools
of interpretation. The treaty object and purpose is a second step that affirms the ordinary
meaning. Adjudicators should not use the treaty object and purpose as a stand-alone
mean of interpretation. The great emphasis on the object and purpose will deny any
relevance of the intents of the parties to the interpretation of their treaty. In addition,
the supplementary means of interpretation are used only in two cases and for one
purpose. They are used to determine the meaning when the interpretation according to
Article 31 resulted in either ambiguous or unreasonable meaning. This means that
supplementary means are used to confirm the ordinary meaning resulting from Article
31 of the VCLT. Following the logical sequence of the rules of interpretation will led
to correct conclusions.

In sum, I argued that interpretation is not an exact science, but it is still a science
requiring the application of particular rules to produce correct results. In addition, the
terms of the treaty are the sources of the intents of the parties who have employed these
terms to express their ordinary meaning. The context of the treaty is not its historical
or political context; it is the meaning of the terms within the whole treaty. The treaty
object and purpose are not a stand-alone mean of interpretation and are not an
independent source of the parties' intents. It is a second step to confirm the ordinary
meaning and it cannot override the clear meaning of the text. Moreover, emphasizing
the treaty object and purpose in interpretation may deny the relevance of intentions of
the treaty parties. Adjudicators have to examine exhaustively all interpretation
elements, according to its logical sequence, to find the real and correct meaning of the
treaty.
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III.

Contemporary Case Law

The question of whether the MFN clause should be applied to matters of dispute
settlement in BITs or not is a question about how arbitral tribunals should interpret this
clause. There are two visions established in the jurisprudence and no one of them can
claim a numerical supremacy of supporters. The first vision argues that the MFN clause
should be applied to dispute settlement provisions in BITs. The second vision argues
that this clause should not be applied to dispute settlement provisions in BITs.

The previous two points of views are driven by two conflicting decisions of the ICSID
followed by two lines of subsequent tribunals' decisions that followed both sides. The
first section of this chapter discusses the contemporary case law on the application of
the MFN clause to dispute settlement provisions in BITs. I indicate the problems with
the decisions that have applied MFN clauses to dispute settlement provisions in BITs.
The second section provides the solutions for these problems by discussing the
decisions that have rejected this application.

A.

Case Law that has applied the MFN Clause to Dispute Settlement

Provisions in BITs:

The excessive protection of the foreign investors and investments is the corner stone of
this line of thinking of the arbitral tribunals. This vision of thinking can be classified
under the objective understanding of the interpretation. They create international norms
without the consent of the states. They override the ordinary meaning of the treaty
provisions by many considerations that vary from a tribunal to another. These
considerations are; protecting foreign investors internationally by facilitate the access
to international arbitration; the harmonization of dispute settlement provisions by
connecting provisions of same kind in other BITs, and adopt a broad interpretation to
MFN clauses to benefit from state's broad consent retroactively after initiating
international arbitration.
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1.

Maffezini v. Spain:

The confusion behind the incorporation of dispute settlement provisions form other
BITs to the basic BIT by using the MFN clause arose out form the tribunal's decision
in Maffezini v. Spain. This was the first ICSID decision that dealt with the interpretation
and the application of the MFN clause to dispute settlement provisions in BITs.

In Maffezini v. Spain case, the question before the tribunal was whether the Argentine
Claimant is able to initiate arbitration before pursuing local remedies for eighteen
months as provided for under Spain-Argentina BIT, or whether he could benefit, under
MFN clause, from Spain-Chile BIT that provides more favorable access conditions to
international arbitration. The Spain-Chile BIT provided for six months waiting without
prior domestic recourse before national courts.302

According to the dispute settlement provision in the Spain-Argentina BIT, disputes that
arise out of this BIT and concerning an investment between an investor of one
contracting party and the other contracting party, may be submitted to international
arbitration "in any of the following circumstances:

a) at the request of one of the parties to the dispute, if no decision has been
rendered on the merits of the claim after the expiration of a period of
eighteen months from the date on which the proceedings referred to in
paragraph 2 of this Article have been initiated, or if such decision has been
rendered, but the dispute between the parties continues.
b) if both parties to the dispute agree thereto.303

The MFN clause in Article IV (2) of the Spain-Argentina BIT provided "in all matters
subject to this Agreement, this treatment shall not be less favorable than that extended
by each Party to the investments made in its territory by investors of a third country".304
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Spain argued that the Spain-Chile BIT in respect of Argentina is res inter alios acta
and the claimant cannot invoke the application of the dispute settlement provisions in
this BIT.305 Moreover, the term "all matters" refers to substantive matters or the
material aspects of the treatment and does not refer to the procedural or jurisdictional
matters.306 In addition, under the principle ejusdem generis the MFN clause should be
applied only to the same matters, and cannot be extended to matters that are different
from those in the basic BIT.307 Above all, the purpose of the MFN clause is to avoid
discrimination against foreign investors and this discrimination take place only to
within the substantive treatment to investors.308

Although, the tribunal admitted the fact that the basic treaty - Spain-Argentina BITdoes not refer expressly to dispute settlement provisions as subject matter of the MFN
clause, the tribunal rejected Spain's arguments.

309

The tribunal gathered many

justifications for its new mistaken interpretation and application. This mistaken and
pro-investor interpretation is a result of the neglect and misapplication of the
international rules of interpretation in the VCLT.

The tribunal considered that nowadays there is an inextricable relation between
settlements arrangements and the protection of foreign investors.310 The tribunal added
that international arbitration has replaced the old abuse practices of the past by a new
international protection.311 Moreover, the court admitted that the investors' rights and
interests are better protected by international arbitration rather than recourse to
domestic courts, which are preferred by the host states.312

The tribunal asserted that, if the third-party contain dispute settlement arrangements
that provide more favorable protection to investors' rights and interests, this protection
should be extended to the beneficiary of the MFN clause in the basic BIT. 313 The
tribunal did not require any references of incorporation in the MFN clause, since the
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subject matter of the basic BIT is the same subject matter of the another BIT, which is
the protection of investors or the promotion of trade.314

In addition, the tribunal examined Spain's practices during the negotiation that had led
to the recent BIT and its negotiation with other countries at the same time.315 The court
concluded that the Spain supported the investors' right to submit investment disputes
directly to international arbitration.316 Moreover, the tribunal examined in detail Spain's
practices in respect of BITs with other countries and the tribunal concluded that Spain
preferred practice that allows access to international arbitration.317

Another justification to this mistaken interpretation is that the application of the MFN
clause to dispute settlement provisions will lead to the harmonization of dispute
settlement provisions by linking the all BITs of the host state together through MFN
clauses.318 The tribunal concluded that the MFN clause in the Spain-Argentina BIT
includes phrase "all matters", therefore, the application of the MFN clause should be
expanded to cover dispute settlement provisions. According to the tribunal, the
previous phrase asserted that the parties implicitly agreed to apply the MFN clause to
matters of dispute settlement in BITs.319 Since the BIT did not explicitly exclude
dispute settlement arrangements from the subject matter of MFN clause.

For all these reasons, the tribunal found that the MFN clause linked the "the SpainArgentina BIT" - the basic treaty- to other Spain's BITs and, under two conditions the
investor can rely on more favorable conditions to access international arbitration. First,
both the basic BIT and the host state’s third-country BIT have to deal with the same
subject matter, which is protecting investors' rights and interests or the promotion of
the trade. Second, a more favorable treatment that is granted by a third-party treaty to
another investor.320
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I believe that the tribunal has adopted a broad and mistaken interpretation to the MFN
clause to extend the scope of its application to dispute settlement arrangements in BITs.
The tribunal has committed many mistakes in the interpretation of this clause to provide
excessive protection to the foreign investors regardless the treaty provisions or their
ordinary meaning.

The interpretation of this clause came one-side oriented, investor oriented, and gave
the ultimate effect to facilitate access to international arbitration to better protect
investors' rights and interests. The tribunal gave the priority to the interests of the
investor rather than the host state. How this could be justified against the host state
without its clear acceptance and based on the interpretation of the MFN clause.

The arbitral tribunal depended on the broad wording of the MFN clause that included
the phrase "all matters" to interpret the ambiguity of this text in favor of the investor
based on the implicate acceptance of the treaty parties. The tribunal failed to follow the
logical sequence of the rules in Articles 31 and 32 of the VCLT that reflects the logical
and natural progression of the interpretation process of any treaty. This progression
should starts with the ordinary meaning of the text, then the context, object and purpose
and then any external elements that reflect the intent of the parties. This tribunal gave
the priority to many tools of interpretation except the text of the treaty to expand the
application of the MFN clause beyond what the parties had intended to. This tribunal's
decision gave the investor the right to amend the treaty after its conclusion. The phrase
"all matters" is silent on whether the MFN clause covers dispute settlement
arrangements or not. The MFN clause is a "term of art" that has a history of application
according to which it applies only to substantive treatment. The tribunal should not
interpret the silence of this clause to establish a meaning against the ordinary meaning
of this "term of art", regardless its well-known interpretation. Moreover, the starting
point in interpreting this silence is the minimum limitation of state sovereignty, which
works in favor of limiting the protection of investors. Even the ordinary meaning of the
phrase "all matters" affirm this assumption - the minimum limitation of state
sovereignty - and does not sufficient to override it.

In interpreting the MFN clause, the tribunal just skipped the other means of
interpretation such as ordinary meaning of the treaty text and context. The tribunal
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grounded its interpretation on the purpose of the BIT, which is the protection of
investors. However, Spain asserted that the purpose of the whole treaty is to prevent
discrimination in relation to the material economic treatment not the procedural
treatment.321 The tribunal put great emphasis on the purpose of the BIT to the extent
that it denied any relevance to the intents of the parties. I argue that the tribunal failed
to read the treaty in a manner that gives effect to the object and purpose of the whole
BIT. Article 31 of the VCLT speaks of one singular "object and purpose". It is
unacceptable to say that the singular "object and purpose" is related to a single
provision. Since this contradict with Article 31 of the VCLT that speaks of the entire
treaty as relevant to interpretation not its individual provisions. Moreover, the purpose
of a treaty is not a stand-alone mean of interpretation. It is used to confirm the ordinary
meaning that should be given to the terms of the BIT in their context.

The tribunal assumed that there is a direct relation between the procedural and
substantive provisions in BITs, so it applied the MFN clause to the procedural
provisions. However, the distinction between the substantive provisions in an
investment treaty and the provisions conferring adjudicative power to arbitral tribunal
is straightforward. The substantive provisions address the contracting state parties.
While the procedural provisions address an international arbitral tribunal and disputing
parties. These disputing parties are not the state parties to BIT, but the investor and the
host state. Both investor and host state enter into a relationship of procedural equality
before the arbitral tribunal once a dispute has been submitted to it. This procedural
relationship subjects to the equality of arms principle in international litigation. This
principle is not respected when one of the disputing parties has the ability to amend the
rules that regulating the jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal after the dispute has arisen.
In addition, both of these kinds of provisions have its own purpose and each of them
imposes different obligations and rights. The object of the substantive provisions is
investments that made by the nationals of one contracting state on the territory of the
other contracting state. The object of procedural provisions is creating a jurisdictional
mandate for an international arbitral tribunal to settle disputes between the foreign
investor and the host state who are in an equal procedural relationship. The invalidity
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of substantive provisions cannot affect the validity of the procedural provisions in the
BIT and the contrary is right.

After skipping the other means of interpretation, the tribunal mentioned three kinds of
practices; public practice, practice of the negotiation that led to the conclusion of the
BIT and subsequent practices with other BITs. All these practices lack the
qualifications of subsequent practice under Article 31 (3) the VCLT. Subsequent
practice should be an element of interpretation insofar it consists a sufficient, consistent
and notable pattern of a state behavior related to the treaty in question. This practice
should be between the parties of the BIT in question and should be related to the
implementation or interpretation of this BIT or any instrument related to the treaty,
concluded by one of the parties, and accepted by the others. Adjudicators who rely on
the previous materials, they rely on clear interpretive materials according to the VCLT.

The practices that were mentioned by the tribunal are not relevant to the interpretation
of the BIT in the question before this tribunal. The old abuse practice of the past and
Spain's practice regard the other BITs were not between the parties of the dispute before
the tribunal. In addition, the practices during the negotiation that led to the BIT do not
consider a subsequent practice according to article 31 of the VCLT. States negotiate
and draft BITs as separated deals between two parties these BITs are governed by the
principle pacta sunt servanda. Indeed, these practices do not reflect any understanding
of the parties to the MFN clause in this case and are not relevant to treaty interpretation.

Finally, the application of MFN clause to disputes settlement arrangements will not
lead to the harmonization of these arrangements. On the contrary, the incorporation of
these arrangements would increase the treaty shopping in BITs that would affect the
binding nature of BITs. Moreover, this will lead to the counterproductive to the
harmonization of dispute settlement provisions. Above all, there is no any national or
international rule that requires from an arbitral tribunal to harmonize the dispute
settlement mechanisms in BITs.
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2.

National Grid Plc. v. Argentine Republic:

After Maffezini award, many tribunals followed the same line of thinking with the same
conclusion, but with different analysis. One of these cases is National Grid Plc. v.
Argentine Republic.

In this case, Argentina asserted that the wording of the MFN clause in question is
different from the MFN clause in Maffezini case, since the text of the treaty indicates
that the parties had not intended to apply the MFN clause to dispute settlement
provisions.322

Article 3 of the UK-Argentina BIT included the National treatment and Most-favored
Nation Provisions. Article 3 (2) of this Article reads as follow, "Neither Contracting
Party shall in any way impair by unreasonable or discriminatory measures the
management, maintenance, use, enjoyment or disposal of investments, to treatment less
favorable than that which it accords to its own investors or to investors of any third
State".323

The tribunal affirmed that the previous MFN clause does not expressly refer to the
dispute settlement mechanisms, however, this clause affirms that these mechanisms are
not included among the exceptions of the application of this clause. 324 The tribunal
asserted, "As a matter of interpretation, specific mention of an item excludes others:
expressio unius est exclusio alterius".325 The tribunal used the same justifications of
the Maffezini tribunal. It concluded that the interpretation of "most-favored nation
treatment" with respect to the disposal of investment includes the protection of the
investment through international arbitration.

While the tribunal in Maffezini v. Spain grounded its jurisdiction on the broad wording
of MFN clause the included the phrase "all matters", the tribunal in National Grid Plc.
v. Argentine Republic found that the MFN treatment with respect to "the use and enjoy
322
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of investments" expands the scope of the application of this clause to cover dispute
settlement mechanisms.326 This allows the incorporation of dispute settlement
provisions in other argentine BITs that accord favorable procedural conditions with the
UK-Argentina BIT. The tribunal affirmed that submitting disputes only to domestic
courts is a procedural matter that leads to the inequity among investors, which will
defeat the object and purpose of the BIT.

The same mistaken way of Maffezini, the interpretation of the MFN clause came oneside oriented, investor oriented, and gave the ultimate effect to facilitate access to
international arbitration to guarantee the better protection of foreign investors' rights
and interests. Although, the wording of the MFN clause did not include any mention to
dispute settlement arrangements, the tribunal interpreted its silence in favor of the
interests of the investors. The tribunal put great emphasis on the purpose of the BIT,
protecting investors, to the extent that it denied any relevance to the intent of the parties
to the interpretation process.

3.

RosInvest Co UK Ltd. v. The Russian Federation:

The arbitral tribunals that followed the Maffezini way of thinking relied on the broad
interpretation of MFN clauses to expand their jurisdiction under more favorable
conditions that allow foreign investors to access international arbitration. The
RosInvest tribunal relied on the MFN clause to expand the subject matter of the
international arbitration's jurisdiction. This case is a glaring example of how can the
arbitral tribunals ignore the clear ordinary meaning of the treaty terms and adopt
interpretations that are against the intent of the parties.

The basic BIT of the UK - Soviet Union allowed the submission of compensation
disputes only to international arbitration, but not for the adjudication of expropriation
itself that was under the jurisdiction of the domestic courts of the parties.327 The MFN
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clause provided protection regarding the "management, maintenance, use, enjoyment
or disposal of investment".328 The tribunal used this clause in the basic BIT to expand
its scope of jurisdiction to cover the disputes about expropriation by incorporating
better procedural arrangements in other BITs. This better protection is existed in the
Denmark-Russia BIT provisions that allow the access to international arbitration for
both compensation and expropriation disputes. The tribunal found that the DenmarkRussia BIT provided for more favored procedural treatment than what the UK - Soviet
Union BIT provided for.329

States may have many significant reasons to limit the jurisdiction of international
arbitral tribunals. Both adjudicators and investors have to put these restrictions in mind
before initiating an investment. The states parties to the BIT have agreed upon these
dispute settlement arrangements. These arrangements are in favor of the interests of the
both contracting states. With respect to expropriation, both United Kingdom and Soviet
Union have decided - in the BIT - that the affected investor has the right to prompt
review by a judicial authority of the Contracting Party making the expropriation.330
However, the tribunal completely ignored the explicit intent of states parties and the
clear meaning of the treaty texts and expanded its jurisdiction to subject matter beyond
the intent of the parties to the BIT. This interpretation forms a clear violation to ratione
consensus.

4.

Hochtief Aktiengesellschaft. v. Argentine Republic:

The arbitral tribunal in Hochtief case continued to interpret MFN clause in the similar
way of Maffezini case. The Argentina-Germany BIT, the basic BIT, provided for
arbitration after pursuing local remedies for eighteen months.331 Under the MFN clause
in the basic BIT, the tribunal found that the investor could circumvent this period and

payment of compensation under Articles 4 or 5 [Article 5 was on expropriation] of this Agreement, or
concerning any other matter consequential upon an act of expropriation in accordance with Article 5 of
this Agreement, or concerning the consequences of the non-implementation, or of the incorrect
implementation, of Article 6 of this Agreement.
328
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submit the dispute to international arbitration before the elapsing of this period, as
provided for in the Argentina-Chile BIT.332

I believe that the tribunal by this decision helped the investor to circumvent the treaty
procedural obligations that stand in his way to international arbitration. This proves
that the arbitral tribunals assume that the single object and purpose of the BIT is to
protect the foreign investors. The great emphasis that they put on the object and purpose
will deny any relevance of the intents of the parties to the interpretation of the BIT. The
object and purpose do not contain direct obligations; they serve to affirm the ordinary
meaning. Therefore, the treaty "object and purpose" is not a stand-alone mean of
interpretation. It serves to confirm the ordinary meaning of the texts that reflects the
intentions of the treaty parties.

5.

Impregilo S.p.A. v. Argentine Republic:

In similar way, the Argentina-Italy BIT did not allow disputes to be submitted to the
ICSID before pursuing local remedies for eighteen months before the domestic
administrative or judicial bodies. Under the MFN clause in article 3 (1) of the
Argentina-Italy BIT the investor sought to apply the more generous provisions in the
Argentina-US BIT. Article VII of the Argentina-US BIT provided: "the investor may
choose to submit the dispute for resolution to the domestic courts or administrative
tribunals, or to deal with it in accordance with previously agreed dispute settlement
procedures, or, after six months from the date on which the dispute arose, to submit it
to international arbitration".333

Argentina's two main new arguments were; first, the MFN clause in the Argentina-Italy
BIT refers to the granted treatment to investments "in the territory", while arbitration
takes place outside Argentina and beyond its sovereign powers. Second, resorting to
domestic courts cannot be less favorable choice to investors.334
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The arbitral tribunal affirmed that the term "treatment" in the MFN clause is wide
enough to expand the application of this clause to dispute settlement provisions.
Moreover, the phrase "all other matters regulated by this argument" also is wide enough
to expand the scope of the application of the MFN clause to cover dispute settlement
arrangements.335 The tribunal asserted that the words "within its own territory" limit
the scope of MFN clause with respect to treatment of the host state. The tribunal
affirmed that the legal protection that Argentina shall give to the investor is a question
before the tribunal and Argentina has no power to decide the way of this protection.
Moreover, this legal protection is not tied to a particular territory. Therefore, the
tribunal found that the phrase "within its own territory" does not exclude dispute
settlement provisions from the scope of the application of MFN clauses.336 In addition,
the tribunal believed that "a system that gives a choice is more favorable to the investor
than a system that gives no choice"337.

Based on the wide interpretation of the MFN clause, the tribunal found that under the
more favored conditions in the Argentina-US BIT, the investor could choose between
domestic courts and international arbitration without any legal need to pursue
compulsory local remedies before access to international arbitration.

B.

Case Law that has rejected the Application of the MFN Clause to Dispute

Settlement Provisions in BITs:

The previous line of thinking in Maffezini and the subsequent decisions of the various
arbitral tribunals adopted a mistaken interpretation to the MFN clause. Indeed, the
proponents of applying MFN clauses to dispute settlement have found strong
opposition. Many arbitral tribunals rejected the application of the MFN clause to
dispute settlement provisions in BITs without an explicit consent form the BITs' parties
to apply this clause to matters of dispute settlement. They require that this clause
expressly indicate that the two parties intended the application of this clause to such
arrangements. The followers of this vision respect the international rules of
interpretation in the VCLT. This vision recognizes that the agreement between the
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parties to arbitrate is a prerequisite for national or international arbitration. This opinion
affirms that this agreement should be clear and unambiguous.

1.

Plama v. Bulgaria:

Plama v. Bulgaria is a unique case, the investor in this case sought to rely on the MFN
clause to replace the entire dispute resolution mechanism that provided for in the basic
BIT with another mechanism.338 In this case, the claimant, a Cypriot investor, under
Bulgaria-Cyprus BIT (the basic) was limited to access international arbitration for
disputes concerning the amount of compensation for expropriation under the
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules only. The question before the tribunal was whether this
investor could benefit from the host state's broader consent to ICSID arbitration under
other BITs that allows access to ICSID for any breach to these applicable BITs.

The MFN clause in Article 3 (1) of the Bulgaria-Cyprus BIT provided "each
Contracting Party shall apply to the investments in its territory by investors of the other
Contracting Party a treatment which is not less favorable than that accorded to
investments by investors of third states"339.

The most obvious thing in the arbitral tribunal's decision is the tribunal's reasoning to
make a choice between the competing ordinary meanings based on the logical sequence
of the rules of interpretation in the VCLT.

The tribunal asserted that it is not clear whether the term "treatment" in the MFN clause
includes or excludes the application of disputes settlement provisions contained in
other BITs to which Bulgaria is a party. The tribunal examined the context of the MFN
clause and found that it may support the Claimant demands; however, the context alone
in the light of the other elements of interpretation was not persuadable to the tribunal.340
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The tribunal examined the object and purpose of the Bulgaria-Cyprus BIT in the
preamble and the title, this "object and purpose" was "the creation of favorable
conditions for investments by investors of one Contracting Party in the territory of the
other Contracting Party"341. The tribunal asserted that the object and purpose of the
treaty are not sufficient to conclude that the contracting parties had intended to use
MFN clause to incorporate settlement disputes mechanisms from other BITs to the
basic BIT. The tribunal was mindful of the Sir Ian Sinclair’s warning to not to put great
emphasis on the "object and purpose" to an extreme form to the extent that denies the
relevance of the intentions of the treaty parties.342

The tribunal also examined the practices of Bulgaria with other states for clarifying the
meaning of the BIT text. These practices showed that Bulgaria has concluded more
liberal dispute settlement provisions. The tribunal held that the practices of Bulgaria
with other states are note relevant for the interpretation of the Bulgaria-Cyprus BIT,
since the negotiations between Bulgaria and Cyprus did not indicate that the parties had
intended to provide for the MFN clause a meaning based on the Bulgarian practices
with other states. Moreover, the tribunal found that these negotiations indicate that the
contracting parties had not intended to extend the application of MFN clause to dispute
settlement provisions.343

With respect to the circumstances surrounding the conclusion of the BIT, the tribunal
affirmed that in the time of the conclusion of the BIT in question Bulgaria was under
the communist regime that favored BITs with limited protection for foreign investors
and limited dispute settlement provisions. These circumstances of the Bulgaria-Cyprus
BIT indicate that the contracting parties did not intend to extend the application of MFN
clause to dispute settlement provisions in BIT.344

The tribunal affirmed the fact that the traditional diplomatic protection by home states
for their citizens has been replaced by investor's direct access to international
arbitration against the host states. This makes investors-states arbitration largely
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accepted avenue for resolving investment disputes. However, the tribunal emphasized
that this phenomena does not override the fundamental prerequisite for arbitration: an
agreement of state – investor to arbitrate, which is an established principle in the
domestic and international law and this agreement must be clear and unambiguous.345
Moreover, the tribunal asserted that this agreement to arbitrate consists of state's
consent to arbitrate in advance in respect of disputes that are covered by the BIT, and
then the acceptance thereof by the investor if he so desires.346

With respect to the interpretation of the silence of MFN clause, the tribunal asserted
that it could not be presumed that the contracting states had agreed to replace by
incorporating disputes settlement mechanisms from other BITs that have been
negotiated in entirely different circumstances and context. 347 Moreover, such intents
must be clearly expressed.

With respect to the alleged harmonization of dispute settlement provisions, the tribunal
affirmed that this could not be achieved by the reliance of the arbitral tribunals on the
MFN clauses.348 This would provide investor with "basket of treatment" with respect
of dispute settlement provisions, and then he will has the ability to pick up and choose
provisions from various procedural provisions in the various BITs to which the host
state party. The host states would find themselves in confront of various number of
dispute mechanisms to which they had not given their consent. Indeed, this would lead
to the counterproductive to the harmonization of dispute settlement arrangements in
the BITs of the host state.

As a result, the tribunal concluded that the MFN clause in question should not be
interpreted to as providing the consent of Bulgaria to arbitrate the recent dispute.
Moreover, the investor cannot rely on the MFN clause to incorporate more favorable
dispute settlement provision from the other BITs to which Bulgaria is a contracting
party.349
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I believe that the tribunal in Plama v. Bulgaria applied the international means of
interpretation in the VCLT to determine the real meaning of the treaty text without any
oriented interpretation. The tribunal balanced between the evidence to clarify the real
meaning of the MFN clause. With the generality of the text, it weighted between the
object and purpose, practices, circumstance surrounding the BIT and its conclusion to
clarify the ordinary meaning of the text. The tribunal gave each mean of interpretation
its value to interpret the MFN clause, and elaborated how it managed to conclude the
final adopted interpretation.

2.

Vladimir Berschader and Moïse Berschader v. The Russian Federation:

This case is an obvious example that even if the MFN clause has the same wording of
the MFN clause in Maffezini case that include the phrase "all matters", it should not be
applied to dispute settlement provisions. Similarly, in the Rosinvest case, Russia argued
that only disputes concerning the amount or mode of compensation for expropriation
could be submitted to international arbitration.350 Under article (10) of (the basic BIT)
the Belgium-Russian Federation BIT, only Russian arbitration court has the jurisdiction
to determine whether an expropriation took place or not.351 The investor attempted to
rely on the MFN clause in article 2 in the basic treaty to benefit from more favored
conditions in the Denmark - Russia BIT that provided international arbitration for any
investment disputes falling under the BIT.352

The arbitral tribunal asserted that the ordinary meaning of the phrase "all matters
covered by the present treaty" is clear, however, it must be seen in its context in the
BIT with relation to the definition of the treatment that shall be applied to these
matters.353 The tribunal found that the BIT did not include a definition for "the most
favored nation clause". The tribunal relied on the Protocol of the Treaty that provides
the most favorable treatment to the investors in the territory of one party from the
nationals of the other contracting party.354 The tribunal found that linking between "all
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matters"," treatment" and "in its territory" indicates that the MFN clause is applied only
to the material rights in the territory of one of the contracting party to the BIT, so the
MFN clause should be applied only to substantive matters. Then the tribunal rejected
the application of MFN clause to dispute settlement provisions, since the phrase "all
matters" cannot expand this application beyond the intents of the parties to the BIT.

In my opinion, the tribunal found that the starting point to determine whether the MFN
clause should be applied to dispute settlement provisions or not must be assessed
according to the intent of the contracting parties and based on the interpretation of the
basic BIT. The ordinary meaning of the MFN clause cannot be determined, and its
broad wording was not persuadable, to the tribunal, to expand its scope of application
to dispute settlement provisions. The object and purpose of the treaty is, the ordinary
aim of any BIT, to promote and protect investments, however, this broad statement was
not able to construct an ordinary meaning to the MFN clause. Moreover, there was no
any preparatory work, subsequent agreements or practices related to the BIT to provide
any guidance to interpret this clause.

The reasonable way to interpret the text and indicate the intents of the parties is to
connect the text of the treaty with other relevant available facts. The tribunal weighed
between the facts and found that the balance between these facts does not affirm the
broad application of the MFN clause to cover dispute settlement provisions. The text
of the treaty does not clearly refer to the ability to incorporate more favorable dispute
settlement arrangements from other BITs to the Belgium-Russian Federation BIT.

The adopted interpretation of the MFN clause in this case followed the same correct
way of interpretation in Plama v. Bulgaria. The tribunal has not been affected by the
interests of the foreign investors to provide pro-investor interpretation. The tribunal
tried to interpret the terms to figure out the real meaning or ordinary meaning in the
light of other elements of interpretation. The tribunal discovered the meaning and did
not create it.
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3.

Daimler Financial Services AG v. Argentine Republic:

In the same vein, the arbitral tribunal in Daimler case rejected to apply the MFN clause
to dispute settlement provisions in BIT. The question arose before the tribunal is
whether the German investor was to pursue domestic remedies before the Argentinian
courts for eighteen months prior to initiate international arbitration according to the
Argentina-Germany BIT or could he benefit from the Argentinian-Chile BIT that did
not require this procedure.355

In this case, the German-Argentine BIT contained two MFN clauses. The first is
general one that addresses the MFN treatment and national treatment.356 The second
MFN clause deals with a particular substantive protection.357

In interpreting MFN clauses in the German-Argentine BIT, the tribunal examined the
ordinary meaning of the term "treatment" in both MFN clauses in the context of the
whole BIT. Then it differentiated between the treatment of foreign investors and the
treatment of investments. Then it examined this ordinary meaning in the light of the
object and purpose of the BIT. Finally, the tribunal searched whether the state practices
would confirm the conclude interpretation or not.
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The tribunal examined the wording of these MFN clauses in light of the treaty text and
context. However, the word treatment employed 13 times in the treaty and its protocol,
none of the treaty provisions gives this word a specific definition. 358 The tribunal found
that the MFN clauses were generally worded and provide clues in different directions.
The tribunal found that the context of the treaty provides a clear limitation to the
generality of the MFN clauses. The tribunal affirmed that the most favored treatment
that provided for by the whole BIT is territorially limited, including MFN clauses that
stated "treatment in its territory".359 In addition, none of the BIT's obligations acts in a
manner outside the host states. The territorial limitation is a general limitation that
governs the universe of the German-Argentine BIT. Therefore, the tribunal concluded
that the BIT clearly expressed a territorial limitation on the scope of the application of
its provisions, including MFN clauses, and did not intended to provide MFN clauses
an extra-territorial scope to cover dispute settlement provisions outside the host state.360

With respect to the treaty object and purpose, it was to promote and protect the
investments in the host state. The tribunal found that the text of the treaty did not
revealed any indications that the parties had intended to protect foreign investments in
the particular manner that was invoked by the investor, by the incorporation of dispute
settlement provisions form other BITs. The tribunal affirmed that it would be incorrect
to characterize the investor's position, as it is more compatible with BIT object and
purpose than the host state's position.361

The tribunal concluded that the treaty materials suggested that the contracting parties
to the German-Argentine BIT had intended to provide the most favorable treatment to
the investments within the host state's territory.362 The tribunal affirmed that none of
the treaty materials authorized the tribunal to interpret MFN clauses in an evolutive
way to achieve a broad meaning that desired by the investors.363 Moreover, the relevant
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subsequent practices of the parties confirm the adopted interpretation by the tribunal.364
In addition, the silence of the states should not be interpreted as consent to access
international arbitration. This states' consent to submit disputes to international
arbitration must be established and interpreted based on clear indicators.

For all the previous reasons, the tribunal rejected to apply MFN clauses, in the basic
BIT, to dispute settlement provisions. The tribunal asserted that the procedural
requirements act as a strict limit to arbitrate disputes between Argentina and the
German investor, and this must be strictly complied with before access to international
arbitration. The tribunal held that

[T]o put it more concretely, since the Claimant has not yet satisfied the
necessary condition precedent to Argentina’s consent to international
arbitration, its MFN arguments are not yet properly before the Tribunal.
The Tribunal is therefore presently without jurisdiction to rule on any
MFN-based claims unless the MFN clauses themselves supply the
Tribunal with the necessary jurisdiction.365
The tribunal in this case followed the same fair way of interpretation according to the
VCLT to determine the rights and obligations of the parties to the BIT. The tribunal
interpreted the text in the light of the treaty context, object and purpose and
supplementary means. The tribunal depended on the explicit meaning of the text not an
implicit one. It did not put great emphasize on the purpose of the treaty, from the
investor's point of view, to not to deny the relevance of the states' intent to
interpretation. It balanced between the competing purposes of the BIT, the protection
of investors and the promotion of investments to put one single purpose to the BIT.

4.

ICS Inspection and Control Services Limited (United Kingdom) v. The

Republic of Argentina:

In the same vein of thinking, the arbitral tribunal in ICS case refused to apply MFN
clause to dispute settlement provisions in BIT. The question arose before the tribunal
is whether the British investor was to pursue domestic remedies before the Argentinian
domestic courts for eighteen months before initiating international arbitration as the
364
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Argentina-UK BIT provided for, or could he benefit from the Argentinian-Lithuania
BIT that has a fork in the road provision. This provision granted the Lithuanian
investors the right to choose between local remedies or submitting their disputes
directly to international arbitration.366

The tribunal in this case followed the same way of interpretation in the previous cases.
In interpreting MFN clauses in the Argentina-UK BIT, the tribunal examined the
ordinary meaning of the term "treatment" in the context of the whole BIT. Then it
differentiated between the treatment of investors and the treatment of investments.
Then it examined this ordinary meaning in the light of the object and purpose of the
BIT. Finally, the tribunal searched whether the state practices would confirm the
concluded interpretation or not.367

The tribunal concluded that the Argentina-UK BIT requires a mandatory eighteen
months litigation prior to pursue international arbitration and the failure of the foreign
investors to comply with this prerequisite deprives the tribunal of its jurisdiction.368
The tribunal refused to apply the MFN clause to dispute settlement provisions.

C.

Conclusion:

In this chapter, I have discussed the contemporary case law on the application of MFN
clauses to dispute settlement provisions in BITs. I have indicated the problems with the
decisions that have applied the MFN clause to dispute settlement provisions in BITs. I
have explored the solutions for these problems by discussing the decisions that have
rejected to apply the MFN clause to dispute settlement provisions in BITs.

There are two visions established in the jurisprudence and no one of them can claim a
numerical supremacy of supporters. The first vision argues that the MFN clause should
be applied to dispute settlement provisions in BITs. The second vision argues that this
clause should not be applied to dispute settlement provisions in BITs. These two points
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of views are driven by two conflicting decisions of the ICSID followed by two lines of
subsequent tribunals' decisions that followed both sides.

The arbitral tribunals that have applied the MFN clause to dispute settlement
provisions in BITs adopted a mistaken interpretation to this clause. The neglect and
misapplication of the international rules of interpretation in the VCLT is what
characterizes the decisions of these tribunals. The confusion behind the incorporation
of dispute settlement provisions form other BITs to the basic BIT by using the MFN
clause arose out form the tribunal's decision in Maffezini v. Spain. This was the first
ICSID decision that dealt with the interpretation and the application of the MFN clause
to dispute settlement provisions in BITs. After Maffezini award, many tribunals
followed the same line of thinking with the same conclusion, but with different analysis
of the MFN clause.

On the other hand, many arbitral tribunals, in Plama v. Bulgaria and the subsequent
decisions, adopted correct interpretation that rejected the application of the MFN clause
to dispute settlement provisions in BITs without an explicit consent form the BITs'
parties to apply this clause to matters of dispute settlement. The followers of this vision
respect the international rules of interpretation in the VCLT. This vision recognizes
that the agreement between the parties to arbitrate is a prerequisite for national or
international arbitration. This opinion affirms that this agreement should be clear and
unambiguous.

Although, the previous cases involving same facts, same legal provisions, similar treaty
rights and obligations, the arbitral tribunals reached different conclusions. They
answered the same question of whether foreign investors should rely on the MFN
clause to incorporate most favorable procedural treatment form the host state’s thirdparty BITs to access international arbitration or not. The first line of decisions adopted
one-side oriented interpretation, investor-oriented, to provide excessive protection to
investors on the international level. The second line of decisions focused on discovering
the interpretation that compatible with the intent of the parties. In sum, I argued that
the duty of adjudicators is to discover the meaning of the treaty provisions, examining
all evidences according to the logical sequence of the interpretational rules in the VCLT
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and provide the states parties to BITs with impartial interpretations. It is not duty of
adjudicators to create meanings or assume the intent of the parties.
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IV.

The Jurisprudence of the Application of the MFN Clause to Matters of
Dispute Settlement in BITs

The main question before the previous tribunals was whether the foreign investors
should rely on the MFN clause to incorporate most favorable procedural treatment form
other BITs to access international arbitration or not. However, the question lurks in the
jurisprudence is whether the MFN clause should serve as a title of jurisdiction to
allocate the adjudicatory authority between domestic courts and international arbitral
tribunals or not. The decisions of Maffezini v. Spain, Plama v. Bulgaria and subsequent
cases created two visions in the jurisprudence of international investment law. Each of
these visions adopts many arguments that support his point of view.

The first section of this chapter discusses these two visions in international investment
law. The second section provides an assessment of the vision that calls for the
application of the MFN clause to dispute settlement provisions and suggestions to
resolve the interpretive problems of the MFN clause.

A.

Two visions in international investment law:

The application of the MFN clause to dispute settlement provisions in BITs is a
question of how arbitral tribunals should interpret these clauses. Should these tribunals
follow the understanding of Plama v. Bulgaria that adopted the ordinary meaning as
an evidence to the parties' intent? Or, they should follow the understanding of Maffezini
v. Spain by giving effect primarily to considerations such as good faith, justice or
reciprocity and a consideration like justice can override this ordinary meaning.

There are two visions established in the jurisprudence and no one of them can claim a
numerical supremacy of supporters. The first vision argues that the MFN clause should
be applied to dispute settlement provisions in BITs. The second vision argues that this
clause should not be applied to dispute settlement provisions in BITs.
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With respect to the first vision, it began with the arbitral tribunal's jurisdictional
decision in Maffezini v. Spain.369 The proponents of this vision argue that the tribunal
in Maffezini v. Spain grounded its interpretation on the public international law.370 This
is clear with the usage of international law concepts, such as res inter alios actos and
the ejusdem generis rules, in application and interpreting the MFN clause in
international treaties.371 The tribunal framed the role of the MFN clause as a positive
systematic contribution to the governance of international investment rules. In this
view, the MFN clause is a multilateralization device that works on the harmonization
of international investment law and the procedural protection of the foreign
investments and investors and will strengthen the power of arbitral tribunals that will
urge the host states to respect their treaty obligations.372 It asserts that foreign investors
should rely on the MFN clause to benefit from dispute settlement provisions in other
BITs that grant other investors more favorable treatment to overcome the problems of
the admissibility of investor - state claims before international arbitral tribunals.373

They affirm that the exhaustion of local remedies or pursuing these remedies for a
period before accessing to international arbitration might impede the enforcement of
the treaty rights of the foreign investors.374 They emphasize that the national legal
system and domestic courts are insufficient to guarantee the protection and
enforcement of the investment treaty rights, since, BITs does not applied directly within
the domestic legal system of the host state, moreover, the domestic courts lack to the
sufficient independence to judge against their governments to enforce these treaty
rights.375 In addition, arbitral tribunals have accepted that foreign investors should
circumvent the admissibility requirements by relying on the MFN clause to benefit
from the dispute settlement arrangements that are contained in other BITs that grant
other investors most favorable access conditions to international arbitration.376
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They also argue that the debate on the application of the MFN clause is not merely
about selecting the proper interpretation of this clause. The debate has become higher
than this. The MFN clause has become an effective tool by which the foreign investors
can import procedural and substantive provisions from the host state’s third-party
BIT.377 They believe that the broad interpretation of the MFN clause and the ability of
importing dispute settlement provisions form other BITs, is consistent with the
teleological view that BITs are not designed only to protect the rights of foreign
investors, but also to maximize this protection.378

They do not concern about the wording of the MFN clause that varies from BIT to
another, they affirm that this clause should be applied to dispute settlement provisions
in BITs as a general principle in international investment law and this application
should be independent from the exact wording or meaning of the MFN clause in any
dispute.379

With respect to the second vision, the followers of this vision reject the application of
the MFN clause to dispute settlement arrangements in BITs, unless this clause
expressly indicates that the contracting states intended the application of this clause to
these arrangements. This vision recognizes that the agreement of the parties to arbitrate
is a prerequisite for national or international arbitration and such agreement should be
clear and unambiguous.

This vision began with the arbitral tribunal's jurisdictional decision in Plama v.
Bulgaria.380 It argues that the tribunal in this case, by contrast to Maffezini v. Spain,
denied any application of the public international law rules such as ejusdem generis
and the private law thinking characterizes this tribunal.381 The proponents of this vision
affirm that the tribunal equalized between BITs and private contracts and applied the
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pacta sunt servanda rule and it dealt with international arbitration, as it is a commercial
arbitration.382 The tribunal also differentiated between the application of the MFN
clause to dispute settlement provisions and the clear and unambiguous state's consent
as a prerequisite to initiate disputes before international investment arbitration.
Therefore, provisions state's consent is required to apply this clause to dispute
settlement arrangements in BITs. In their opinion, adjudicators should not have a
governance vision in relation to dispute settlement provisions, since their own universe
is the bilateral investment treaty. In addition, the application of the MFN clause to
dispute settlement provisions will lead to the permutations of treaty provisions that lead
to the counterproductive to the harmonization of dispute settlement arrangements.383

According to this opinion, the broad wording of the MFN clause allows its application
only to substantive matters not to the dispute settlement provisions in BITs. There is a
fundamental distinction in public international law between the substantive and
procedural provisions. Whereas, the first kind addresses the parties and imposes
substantive obligations upon the host states, the second kind creates a jurisdictional
mandate for an arbitral tribunal, and addresses arbitral tribunals and dispute's parties
who are in a procedural relation, and this distinction should be taken into consideration
regarding the application of the MFN clause. Therefore, both substantive and
procedural provisions have a different purpose. The object of the substantive provisions
is the investments made by an investor in a host state and the object of the procedural
provisions is the adjudicative power of an arbitral tribunal and the arbitral parties.384
Therefore, the proponents of this vision accept that investors can rely on the MFN
clause, under the basic BIT, to benefit from more favorable substantive treatment in
other BITs, but those investors cannot establish the jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunals
based on this clause.
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B.

The assessment of the vision that calls for the application of the MFN clause

to dispute settlement provisions in BITs and suggestions to resolve the interpretive
problems of the MFN clause:

The MFN clause is of the same nature of any treaty provisions. Interpreting the MFN
clause based on assumptions that it has its special nature, has specifically negotiated or
in the light of the friendly preamble, this will not give us a complete picture.

I believe that the broad wording of the MFN clause does not allows adjudicators to
expand the scope of the application of this clause to matters of dispute settlement in
BITs. This proper interpretation will be reached by resolving the interpretive problems
of the BITs in investor-state arbitration.

The words and terms of this clause have been employed by the treaty parties to express
a specific meaning. The proper application of the means of interpretation will lead to
the correct and consistent meaning of this clause. The starting point of interpretation is
to find the ordinary meaning of the clause. The MFN clause is a term of art that has its
historical background of application and interpretation. This historical background
refers to the application of this clause to substantive matters in BITs. The treaty parties
have employed this clause to express this specific ancient meaning, not the meaning
that may invoked by the foreign investors. This clause may express a new or different
meaning if it is established that the parties to the BIT so intended.

The major problem is that many provisions in BITs, such as the MFN clause, lack
textual determinacy. It may be argued that this indeterminacy is the main reason for the
conflicting decisions and arbitral tribunals struggle because of the generality and
vagueness of the provisions of the BITs. The problem of the interpretation of the MFN
clause is not crystalized in its indeterminacy, but in the misapplication of the available
means of interpretation in the VCLT. Although, interpretation is not an exact science,
it is still a science requiring the application of certain rules to produce correct results.
The following of the logical sequence of the rules of interpretation will reduce the area
of uncertainty as guidance for the choice between the different meanings. It will also
rationalize the interpretation process and adjudicators behavior.
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Adjudicators must first look for the ordinary meaning of the text. This is the starting
point of the interpretation process, in the light of the context and treaty object and
purpose. These terms and words of the provisions have been written by the parties and
reflect the clear intent of these parties. This means that the tribunals must examine the
text of the treaty to find whether the treaty parties intended to expand the scope of the
application of the MFN clause to dispute settlement provisions or not. Searching for
potential limitations is acceptable insofar the text itself allows so. Arbitral tribunals
must not assume the scope of application of any treaty provision. Since this assumption
without an evidence from the text will be misinterpretation. In addition, interpretation
should be impartial not in favor of one of the parties and against the other without clear
evidence from the text.

The silence of the treaty term should be interpreted in the light of clear evidence to
override its ambiguity. The tribunals in Maffezeini, National Grid, Hochtief and
Impregilo ignored the functional history of the MFN clause and interpreted it based on
its generality. This was one-side oriented, investor oriented, interpretation. They
interpreted the silence of the MFN clause in favor of the excessive protection of the
foreign investors. Moreover, the tribunal in RosInvest Co UK Ltd

The Russian

Federation totally ignored the clear meaning of the BIT's provisions and allowed the
investor to submit a dispute to international arbitration against the ordinary meaning of
the text.

Each BIT has limited its application to particular persons "ratione personae" to
particular matters "ratione materiae" or to a certain time "ratione temporii". The treaty
parties may restrict access to international arbitration by specific restrictions such as;
negotiation between investors and host state, pursuing domestic courts for a time or
allow to arbitration for particular disputes. Any interpretation do not respect these
limitations would violate the treaty rights and obligations.

With respect to the treaty object and purpose, all BITs include the phrase "protect and
promote the investments" whether in the preamble, title or the treaty texts. This
impartial object and purpose works in favor of both foreign investors and host states.
It protects the investors, investments and host states. We cannot divided the object and
purpose of a treaty into many objects and purposes according to the provisions of the
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treaty. The MFN clause does not has a specific purpose that is different from the
purpose of the whole BIT. We must read the treaty in a manner that gives effect to the
object and purpose of the whole BIT. Article 31 of the VCLT speaks of one singular
"object and purpose". It is unacceptable to say that a singular "object and purpose" is
related to a single provision. This contradicts Article 31 of the VCLT that speaks of the
entire treaty as relevant to interpretation not its individual provisions.

In addition, the ambiguity of a text does not allow treaty object and purpose to override
the ordinary meaning of this text or other potential context that may indicate this
ordinary meaning. Since, treaty object and purpose is not a stand-alone mean of
interpretation, nor does it contains direct obligations. They serve to affirm the ordinary
meaning of the texts. So, the merely mention of the object and purpose to mysteriously
interpret the MFN clause, is clear evidence of the manipulation of the means of
interpretation. Emphasizing on the treaty "object and purpose" to an extreme extent,
not only will it deny the relevance of the intentions of the treaty parties, but also it will
provide the priority to the interests of the investors with respect to interpretation. Then
interpretation will become a continuation of the treaty negotiation for the sake of the
investors' excessive protection. Connecting the text, context, object and purpose of the
whole treaty will give us a negative answer to the question of whether the MFN clause
should be applied to dispute settlement provision in BITs or not.

The tribunals assumed a direct relation between the procedural and substantive
provisions that covered by the MFN clause, so it applied the MFN clause to the
procedural provisions. However, the distinction between the procedural and
substantive provisions in an investment treaty is straightforward. The substantive
provisions address the contracting state parties. While the procedural provisions
address an international arbitral tribunal and disputing parties. These disputing parties
are not the state parties to BIT, but the investor and the host state. Both investor and
host state enter into a relationship of procedural equality before the arbitral tribunal
once a dispute has been submitted to it. This procedural relationship subjects to the
equality of arms principle in international litigation. This principle is not respected
when one of the disputing parties has the ability to amend the rules that regulating the
jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal after the dispute has arisen. In addition, both of these
kinds of provisions have its own purpose and each of them imposes different
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obligations and rights. The object of the substantive provisions is investments that
made by the nationals of one contracting state on the territory of the other contracting
state. The object of procedural provisions is creating a jurisdictional mandate for an
international arbitral tribunal to settle disputes between the foreign investor and the
host state who are in an equal procedural relationship. How can one of the parties able
to change the jurisdiction of the tribunal after the risen of this dispute. Finally, the
invalidity of substantive provisions cannot affect the validity of the procedural
provisions in the BIT and the contrary is right.

With respect to the contemporary or subsequent treaty practices of the parties, all the
tribunals that followed Maffezini case have misapplied these means of interpretation.
Article 31 (2) and (3) requires some qualifications for these practices to be relevant.
First, an agreement that signed by all of the treaty parties and relegated to the BIT in
question. Second, any instrument related to the treaty, concluded by one of the parties,
and accepted by the others. Third, subsequent agreements or practices between the
parties related to the treaty. Adjudicators who rely on the previous materials, they rely
on clear interpretive materials according to the VCLT.

However, the BIT stands alone as a separated agreement between the two contracting
states without any contemporary or subsequent practices and agreements. Therefore,
any BIT between one of the parties and a third state is not relevant, since the BIT in the
question should be interpreted not the host state’s third-country BIT. Similarly, the
practices should be between the BIT parties otherwise it would fall under Article 32 of
the VCLT that may be taken into account as a common intent of the parties. However,
according to Article 32 of the VCLT, supplementary means of interpretation are used
only when the application of Article 31 leaves the meaning ambiguous or
unreasonable.385 The contemporary or subsequent treaty practices, in this case, do not
reflect the understanding of the parties.

Some arbitral tribunals and foreign investors have overestimated the functional role of
the MFN clause. Some adjudicators framed the role of this clause as a positive
systematic contribution to the governance of international investment rules. They use
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this clause as a multilateralization device that works on the harmonization of dispute
settlement mechanisms in BITs. This is a mistaken justification for the wrong
interpretation of the MFN clause. First, there is no a general principle in international
law that requires from adjudicators to harmonize dispute settlement provisions in the
various BITs of the host states.386 States themselves who can harmonize these
mechanisms based on their intentions, since these provisions included in treaties that
are concluded by states. Arbitral tribunals should only interpret treaty provisions to
apply them not to guarantee the unity of the wording of these provisions.

On the other hand, the precedents of international arbitral tribunals cannot do nothing
neither with the harmonization of dispute settlement provisions, nor with the
interpretation of any treaty provisions. In international investment arbitration
precedents is of non-binding nature. Arbitral tribunals do not blindly follow the
previous decisions whether the decisions of the same tribunal or other tribunals.
However, these tribunals critically analyze the decisions of each other to build their
decisions on better arguments, not to follow precedents. In addition, the application of
the MFN clause to matters of dispute settlement would lead to the counterproductive
to the harmonization.

The VCLT provides an appropriate framework of interpretation that recognizes equally
the legitimate rights and interests of both host states and foreign investors. Arbitral
tribunals have to acknowledge completely the binding nature of these rules as a starting
point in treaty interpretation. Merely referring to Articles 31 and 32 of the VCLT
without their proper application would be useless. The application of these
interpretational rules is a part of the acknowledgment of their binding nature. The
application of these interpretational rules will guarantee an effective way to reach
correct interpretations. Arbitral tribunals should analyze the application of these rules
in interpreting a treaty provision. They have to provide the reasonable reasons that led
them to these interpretations. It is not acceptable that adjudicators avoid the application
of the rules of interpretation and just state the concluded interpretations without any
further elaboration of how they reached these results. This reasoning will enrich the
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jurisprudence of treaty interpretation, and respect the ordinary meaning of the treaty
terms that reflects the intentions of the parties. An incomplete application of these rules
will lead to wrong interpretations.

Adjudicators should grant each rule of the rules of interpretation its value according to
the VCLT. Depending on means without the others will lead to wrong interpretations
that contradict the ordinary meaning that reflects the intent of the parties. The starting
point in interpretation should be the ordinary meaning of the text. The context and
treaty object and purpose should be an affirmative tool to the ordinary meaning. The
circumventing these rules to interpret a treaty according to its object and purpose,
would deny any relevance of the intent of the parties to the interpretation of their treaty.

The supplementary means of interpretation are used only in two cases and for one
purpose. They are used to determine the meaning when the application of the general
rule in Article 31 of the VCLT resulted in either ambiguous or unreasonable meaning.
This means that the supplementary means are used to confirm the ordinary meaning
resulting from Article 31 of the VCLT. Adjudicators are obliged to apply the general
rule of interpretation, while they do not have to apply the supplementary means when
the application of the general rule resulted in a clear meaning. The text of the treaty
reflects the agreement between the parties, but these supplementary means do not bind
the treaty parties together.

In sum, in determining whether the MFN clause should be applied to dispute settlement
provisions or not there must not be interpretive assumptions in favor of the foreign
investors or the host states. This application is a matter of treaty interpretation. The
interpretation of the MFN clause is not different form the interpretation of any other
treaty provisions. This clause is not negotiated separately or in a way that differs from
the other treaty provisions. This MFN clause subjects to certain limitations that limit
the whole treaty. The scope of the MFN clause should not extend the limitations of the
application of the BIT, which is "ratione personae", "ratione materiae" and "ratione
temporii". The scope application of the BIT should work as a limitation to the
application of the MFN clause.
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The MFN clause should not be applied to dispute settlement provisions in BITs. This
application would increase the uncertainty in international investment arbitration and
no state would be able to predict the outcomes of the interpretation process to any
provision in the BIT. The question would not be what the correct interpretation of the
treaty provisions is, but which rule of the rules of interpretation will be applied. Treaty
interpretation is not an exact science, but it is still a science requiring the application
of particular rules to produce correct results. The problem of interpretation is not
crystalized in the availability of the means of interpretation, but in the misapplication
of the available means of interpretation.
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Conclusion

This thesis has analyzed the interpretation of the international investment treaties and
the application of the MFN clause to matters of dispute settlement provisions in BITs.
The purpose of this thesis is not to discuss whether the using of BITs to harmonize
dispute settlement mechanisms is necessary and feasible or not. This harmonization is
not a legal matter it is a policy choice. States have their sovereign rights to determine
whether to harmonize their mutual treaty rights and obligations or not. The aim of this
thesis is to respect the ordinary meaning of the text of the treaty and other means of
interpretation and to respect the intentions of the parties as it is expressed in the terms
of the treaty. Treaty interpretation must proceed from the ordinary meaning of the
words of the treaty even if we do not like them. It is a necessity to respect the intent of
the treaty parties as it is expressed in treaty provisions, otherwise, state sovereignty will
be useless in international investment law.

In this thesis, I have argued that the interpretation of the MFN clause in relation to its
application to dispute settlement arrangements in BITs is not a today issue. In fact, it is
not the first nor will be the latest "episode" in a long history of a constant demand of
foreigners to prevent domestic courts to hear their cases and instead seek the assurance
of an international or internationalized forum. Indeed, investors, foreigners and
colonial powers always wanted "exceptionality" in the forum that deals with legal
disputes. Foreign investors do not accept the local jurisdiction and demand special
treatment in in a manner where they can control better the outcome of the adjudicative
process. The development of foreign investors' treatment started from the complete
outlawry in the early political communities to what is reflected in the current network
of international investment agreements. I have also explored the evolution of the
investment protection from the early political communities to the recent practices of
international courts and arbitral tribunals that clarify the framework of the MFN clause
and the impact of this framework on the interests of both foreign investors and host
states. The interpretation of this clause plays an important role in determining the scope
of its application. In fact, the debate about the scope of the application of the MFN
clause to dispute settlement provisions in BITs, is about how this clause should be
interpreted.
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I have explored the nature of treaty interpretation, the analysis of Articles 31 and 32 of
the VCLT and the arbitral use of these articles to interpret BITs. I have argued that the
world of any human or legal person consists of normative universes. These universes
structured around the possibility of right or wrong, of lawful or unlawful or of valid or
void. International law is one of these normative universes. It includes rules and
restrictions that validate or invalidate certain practices or construct a certain reality.
Therefore, interpretation is a process that in fact may lead to correct and incorrect
conclusions.

Each arbitral tribunal applies the rules of interpretation form its point view. As a result,
the values of these rules vary from one tribunal to another and from a dispute to another.
This entails unpredictability and inconsistency of the tribunals' decisions with a clear
tendency to provide excessive protection to investors. The VCLT provides an
appropriate framework of treaty interpretation that recognizes equally legitimate rights
and interests of both the host states and the foreign investors. Arbitral tribunals have to
acknowledge the completely binding nature of these rules. This will not happen until
they adopt the exhaustive application of the means of interpretation in the VCLT. The
actual application of these means works as a roadmap to reach the correct meanings.
Interpretation is not an exact science, but it is still a science requiring the application
of particular rules to produce correct results. Therefore, the problem of interpretation
is not crystalized in the availability of interpretational means, but in the misapplication
of the available means of interpretation.

The terms of the treaty are the sources of the intents of the parties who have employed
these terms to express their ordinary meaning. The context of the treaty is not its
historical or political context; it is the meaning of the terms within the whole treaty.
The treaty object and purpose are not a stand-alone mean of interpretation and are not
an independent source of the parties' intents. It is a second step to confirm the ordinary
meaning and it cannot override the clear meaning of the text. Moreover, emphasizing
the treaty object and purpose in interpretation may deny the relevance of the intentions
of the treaty parties to the interpretation of their treaty. Adjudicators have to examine
exhaustively all interpretation elements, according to its logical sequence, to find the
real and correct meaning of the treaty provisions.
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In addition, I have discussed the contemporary case law on the application of MFN
clauses to dispute settlement provisions in BITs. I have indicated the problems with the
decisions that have applied the MFN clause to dispute settlement provisions in BITs. I
have explored the solutions for these problems by discussing the decisions that have
rejected to apply the MFN clause to dispute settlement provisions in BITs. Although,
these cases involving same facts, same legal provisions, similar treaty rights and
obligations, the arbitral tribunals reached different conclusions. They answered the
same question of whether foreign investors should rely on the MFN clause to
incorporate most favorable procedural treatment form a third-party treaty to access
international arbitration or not. The first line of decisions adopted one-side oriented
interpretation, investor-oriented, to provide excessive protection to investors on the
international level. The second line of decisions focused on discovering the
interpretation that compatible with the intent of the parties. I have argued that the duty
of adjudicators is to discover the meaning of the treaty provisions, examining evidence
according to the logical sequence of the interpretational rules in the VCLT and provide
the states parties to BITs with impartial interpretations. Indeed, adjudicators are not
supposed to create the meaning, but to discover it.

I have also discussed the jurisprudence of the application of the MFN clause to matters
of dispute settlement in BITs. The question lurks in the jurisprudence is whether the
MFN clause should serve as a title of jurisdiction to allocate the adjudicatory authority
between domestic courts and international arbitral tribunals or not. There are two
visions established in the jurisprudence and no one of them can claim a numerical
supremacy of supporters. I have analyzed the two visions in international investment
law. I have provided an assessment of the vision that calls for the application of the
MFN clause to dispute settlement provisions and suggestions to resolve the interpretive
problems of the MFN clause. I have concluded that in determining whether the MFN
clause should be applied to dispute settlement provisions or not there must not be
interpretive assumptions in favor of the foreign investors or the host states. This
application is a matter of treaty interpretation. The interpretation of the MFN clause is
not different form the interpretation of any other treaty provisions. This clause is not
negotiated separately or in a way that differs from the other treaty provisions. This
MFN clause subjects to certain limitations that limit the whole treaty. The scope of the
MFN clause should not extend the limitations of the application of the BIT, which is
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"ratione personae", "ratione materiae" and "ratione temporii". The scope application
of the BIT should work as a limitation to the application of the MFN clause.

The duty of adjudicators is to discover the meaning of the treaty provisions, examining
evidence according to the logical subsequence of the interpretational rules in the VCLT
and provide the parties with impartial interpretations. The establishment of a unified
international system of investors' rights protection or universal investors' rights system
should depend on how many states ratify multilateral investment treaties to make
legally binding commitments to establish such a system. It is not the duty of
adjudicators to impose such a system on states. The application of the means of
interpretation will be misused to create and establish excessive protection to foreign
investors against the intent of states parties who created the BIT. The conflicting
interpretations will outlive and repeat themselves in many decisions. This thesis is an
alert message to the coming generations to apply the rules of interpretation honestly, to
determine the treaty rights and obligations based on facts not assumptions. A full
compliance with the international rules of interpretation in the VCLT will lead to
correct interpretations and ensure that these interpretations are consistent with parties’
intention as it is expressed in the terms of the treaty.
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